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PERSPECTIVES

ALEJANDRO

M.

GARRO*

Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the

U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods**
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of
Goods (Convention) is the product of more than two generations of international
negotiations.' Beginning in 1968, the task of unifying the law of international
*Alejandro M. Garro, Lecturer in Law. Columbia University. This paper was submitted to the 81 st
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries, June 26-29, 1988.
**The Editorial Reviewer for this article was Kevin M. Harris.
I. Preparation of a uniform law for the international sale of goods began in 1930 at the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome. See Bonell, The
UNIDROIT Initiative for the Progressive Codification of Internation Law, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
413 (1978). After a long interruption in the work as a result of the Second World War, the draft was
submitted to a diplomatic conference in The Hague in 1964, which adopted two conventions, one on
the international sale of goods (ULIS) and the other on the formation of contracts for the international
sale of goods (ULF): July 1. 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107, 169, 3 I.L.M. 854 (1964). Both conventions
went into effect in 1972 by the minimal ratification of five states. As of January 1, 1988, Belgium,
Gambia. the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. San Marino,
and the United Kingdom are parties to these conventions. The United States joined the conference
at the last minute. when it was too late to accomplish major changes. Accordingly. the United States
saw no reason to adopt a convention in which it had no hand in establishing. See Comment, A New
Unifbrm Law for the InternationalSole of Goods: Is It Compatible with American Interests?, 2 NW.
J.

INT'L L. & Bus. 129 (1980); Landau, Background to U.S. Participation in United Nations

Convention on Contracts.for the Salt' of Goods, 18 INT't. LAw, 29. 30 (1984). Neither ULIS nor ULF
gained acceptance within the socialist and developing countries because on the whole these countries
were not represented at the Hague Diplomatic Conference. Twenty-two of the twenty-seven original
signatories of the 1964 Uniform Laws were European. A few years later, the much more widely
represented forum of UNCITRAL removed the political objection leveled against uniform laws and
conventions produced by regional institutions such as the Hague Diplomatic Conference. For a
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sales was taken over by the United Nations Conference on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), whose broad membership includes countries of different
legal traditions and socio-economic conditions. 2 The final text of the Convention
was finally approved at a diplomatic conference convened by the United Nations
General Assembly in Vienna in 1980. 3
Sixty-two nations were represented at the Vienna Conference. Roughly
speaking, twenty-two from the "Western developed" part of the world, eleven
from "socialist regimes," and twenty-nine from "Third World" countries. 4 This
broad representation is reflected in the text of the Convention, which is the
product of hard-fought compromises. After sketching the background and
present status of the Convention, this article approaches the Convention from the
comparative perspective given by those compromises.
Twenty-one countries had signed the Convention by its deadline, September
30, 1981. 5 As of December 31, 1988, seventeen nations had ratified it. The
history of the Convention, see United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.82.V.5 (1981) [hereinafter Conference
on Contracts]; Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on International Sales Contracts, in
INTERNATIONAL SALES, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

§ 1.01 (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984) [hereinafter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna
Convention].
2. UNCITRAL was established by G. A. Res. 2205 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) reprinted in I Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. COMM'N 65, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1970. Initially, UNCITRAL focused on ULIS to determine whether changes in the
existing text might make it more acceptable to the legal and economic systems of various countries.
By UNCITRAL's second session in 1969, however, it was apparent that ULIS would not be accepted
without extensive alteration. A fourteen-member working group was established to begin drafting a
new text (Brazil, France. Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The Group was
later enlarged to fifteen and three replacements were made, allowing for the participation of Austria,
Czechoslovakia. the Philippines. and Sierra Leone. See J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
GOODS

SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 54 n.9 (1982). The working group met once a year

over the next nine years. After almost a decade of study, the working group produced a Draft
Convention on the International Sales of Goods in 1976 and a Draft Convention on Formation of the
Sales Contract in 1977. In 1978, the full Commission reviewed the drafts and combined them into
a single Draft Convention which was submitted to the 1980 diplomatic conference in Vienna. The
text of the 1978 Draft Convention with a Commentary appears in Conference on Contracts, supra
note 1, at 5. reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 639 (1979). See Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. CoMp. L. 223 (1979).
3. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10. 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, with Annex, United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter Convention]. The
final text and conference proceedings are published in Conference on Contracts, supra note 1, and
may be purchased from United Nations Publications, Room GA-32, United Nations, New York,
N.Y. 10017. The Convention Conference was convened by General Assembly Resolution 33/93.
G.A. Res. 93. 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
4. See Eorsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for tlte International Sale of
Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333, 346 (1983).

5. The signatory countries are Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France. the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho,
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Convention entered into force on January I. 1988, in eleven countries:
Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho. Syria, the United
States. Yugoslavia, and Zambia. In December 1987 four other countries became
Contracting States: Austria, Finland, Mexico, and Sweden. The Convention
entered into force with respect to these countries on January 1.1989, and also
entered into force in Australia on April I, 1989. Norway acceded to the
Convention on July 28, 7 1988, and other countries are presently considering
ratification or accession.
I now turn briefly to the participation of the United States in the drafting and
adoption of the Convention." Delegates from the United States participated
actively in the discussions of the Convention. 9 T he y voted in favor of the final
text at the Vienna Conference, and subsequently recommended to the Secretary
of State that the United States become a party to the Convention. The United
States signed the Convention on August 31, 1981. On September 21, 1983, the
President of the United States asked for the advice and consent of the
the Netherlands, Norway, People's Republic of China. Poland, Singapore, Sweden. the United
States, Venezuela. and Yugoslavia. By signing the Convention. these countries undertook an implicit
obligation to seek ratification in accordance with their domestic constitutional procedures. Countries
which did not sign by the September 30, 1981. deadline may accede to the Convention at any time.
Convention, supra note 3. art. 91(3).
6. Art. 99 (I)of the Convention. supra note 3. provides that the Convention will enter into
force "on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months after the date of
deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance. approval or accession .. .- According to
art. 100, the Convention governs oflers made and contracts concluded alter it becomes eflective in
a country. According to art.
99(2). the Convention will enter into force as to any country which
becomes a Contracting State "on the first day of the month following theexpiration of twelve months
after
the date [the country notifies the U.N. Secretary General that it has accededl." Current
information about the status of the Convention may be obtained from the Treaty Section ol the Oftice
of Legal Affairs. United Nations, New York. N.Y. 10017, Telephone: (212) 963-3918 and from the
UNCITRAL Secretariat. P.0. Box 500. Vienna International Center. A-1400 Vienna. Austria. Telex:
135612: Telephone: (43) (I) 263 1-4060: Telefax: (43) (I)232156.
7. In June 1988. Professor Winship listed thefollowing countries as considering ratification or
accession to the Convention: Czechoslovakia. Denmark. Federal Republic of Germany. German
Democratic Republic. Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland. Winship, 'The haternatmma Law
of Cotrtci: "7it'
United/Nations Convewnioni on Contracts ,or the Internaitionl Sale of Goods,
unpublished manuscript submitted to the American Association of Law Libraries 1988 Annual
Meeting. June 27, 1988 (on file with the author).
8. For a comprehensive discussion of the ratilication process in the United States. see Winship.
Cong'ress and
f/ithe 198) hitlerttionalSales Col veltlion.
16 GA. J.IN]'I, & Ci)51w. L. 707 (1986). Sete
ol.o Il'und & Talt. ('oitti,.'"e
Role iIIthe Iternational Unifittio of Private Law. 16 GA. J. IN'l.
& Cu su.L. 671 (1987).
9. The United Staies delegates to the Vienna conference were John 0. Honnold. E. Allan
Farnsworth, and Peter I-. Plund. They were briefed by the Secretary ol' State's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law, composed of representatives of major legal organizations such Us the
National Conference of Conmissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.
The State Department also appointed a special study group with members knowledgeable in the legal
and business problens of international trade. Se , Winship. /' .)ort.iport Si/es Unte'r the /9N0
Unitel Nations Sales ('omention. 8 HAsrINi S INT'l,
& Ci MP. L. Ri .v.
197, 21)0 (1985) Ihercina ter
Winlship, b".\l-Ir-hnlort sah'.sl.
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Senate to the ratification of the Convention. 10 Unanimous ratification by that
body followed in October 1986.'' On December 11, 1986, officials from the
mission to the United Nations of the United States deposited
the instrument of
12
ratification at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
A summary view of the sphere of application of the Convention is now in
order. The provisions of the Convention govern the formation of international
sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the buyers and sellers arising
from such contracts. 13 At the time of ratification a State may declare that it will
join the convention only in part. A State may refuse to be bound either by Part
I1, on the formation of contracts, or by Part III, on the rights and obligations of
the parties. 14 Only Part I, regarding the sphere of application and other general

10.

President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.

1290 (Sept. 21. 1983). S. TREATY Doc. No. 9. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) reprinted in 22 I.L.M.
1368 (1983): IternationalSale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doe. No. 9 Before tie Senate Comn.
on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) Ihereinafter Hearings on Treats Doe. No. 9].
11. Senate Conmmlittee on Foreign Relations Report. ExEc. REP'T 20, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986): 132 CoNo. REc. S15767-8, 15773-4 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986).
12. U.N. Dep't of Public Information. Press Release l/T/3849, December 11, 1986. See Pfund.
InternationalUnilication of Private Law: A Report on U.S. Participation-1986-87 21 INT'L LAW.
1245, 1247 (1987). For the U.N.-certified official English text of the Convention. see the annex to
the notice of the State Department in 52 Fed.Reg. 6262-80 (1987).
13. The formation provisions appear in Part I1of the Convention, supra note 3 (arts. 14-24),
while the substantive provisions appear in Part Ill (arts. 25-88). Part I (arts. 1-13) defines the
Convention's sphere of application and sets out rules of interpretation applicable to both subsequent
parts. Part IV (arts. 89-101 ) refers to the implementation of the Convention. For short informative
articles on the Convention. see Griffin & Calabrese, New Rules for International Contracts, 74
A.B.A.J. 68 (1988): Rendell. Iternational Sales Convention on the Horizon, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Feb. 1988. at 27: Winship. InternationalSales Contracts Under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17

U.C.C.L.J. 55 (1984) 1hereinafter Winship, Sales Contraetsj: Winship, New Rules for Iternational
Sales. 68 A.B.A.J. 1230 (1982) [hereinafter Winship, New Rules]. See also the summary published
by UNCITRAL. Note by the Secretariat. A/CN.9/307. For more extensive discussion, see C. BIANCA
& M. BONEI.L. COMMENTARY ON THE ]NrERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
(1987) [hereinafter COMMENtARYI: THE CONVENTION IOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A
HANDBOOK O1 BASIC MATERIALS (R. Kathrein & D. Magraw eds. 1987); GUIDE [0 THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS CONV NlION (W. Hancock ed. 1987): J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL
SALES UNDER
"ril-: 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1982) [hereinafter J. HONNOLD, UNiFORm LAW]:
INTERNATIONAL SALES. TIlE UNIrE

NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

Goos (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984) 1hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SALES): INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GooDs: D;BROVNIK LEctREs (P. Sarcevic & P. Volken eds. 1986) Ihereinafter DUBROVNIK LECrUREsJ:
P. Sc ICIITRI-M. UNIFORM SAI.ES LAW: TitE U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GooDs (1986) Ihereinafter UNIFORM SALEis LAWl. For a bibliography on foreign language
materials, see M. WitLL. INTIRNAIIONALL BIBLIOGRAPIlE ZUNI UN-KAUFRECHT (1987).
14. Convention. sulpra note 3, art. 92. Article 90 provides that the Convention does not prevail
over "any international agreement which has already been or may be entered into and which contains
provisions concerning the matters governed by this Convention." Similarly. art. 94 authorizes states
with "closely related legal rules on matters governed by the Convention" to declare that the
Convention will not apply to sales contracts between enterprises with their places of business in these
countries. See Zicgel. Canada ond the 1980 Iternational Sales Convention. 12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 366

(1987) (suggesting that the United Stales and Canada should consider making such a declaration).
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provisions, and 5Part IV, the final provisions on ratification and related matters,
are mandatory. '
An array of exclusions and exceptions based upon the nature of the
transaction, 16 the purpose of the sale,' 7 and the nature of the goods t" limit the
scope of the Convention. In particular, the Convention is not concerned with the
validity of the contract, 19 the effect the contract may have on the title to the goods
sold, 20 or the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the
goods to any person. 2'
The Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose
places of business are in different states and either both of those States has
become a party to the Convention (hereinafter referred to as a Contracting State)
or the rules of private international law of a Contracting State lead to the
15. A contracting state with two or more territorial units may declare that only one or more of
these units has joined the Convention. Convention, art. 93. stupra note 3. Moreover, two or more
contracting states may declare that the Convention does not apply to contracts between parties who
have their places of business in those states. Id., art. 94. A final article provides that a member state
may denounce the Convention or part of it simply by giving formal notification to the United Nations,
Id., art. 101. On the various ratifications choices available to contracting states, see Winship. The
Scope of the Vienna Convention, supra note I,at I- 1,1-39 to 1-48.
16. For example, art. 3 of the Convention. supra note 3. specifically excludes contracts of
services from the Convention. Under the Convention, contracts of sale are distinguished from
contracts for services in two respects. A contract for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
produced is considered to be a sale unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a
substantial part of the materials necessary for their manufacture or production. When the
preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of
labor or other services, the Convention does not apply. Sales by auction and execution are also
excluded from the Convention.
17. Most notable among the exclusions is that of sales of goods for personal, family, or
household use.
18. Stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, money, ships, vessels.
hovercraft. aircraft or electricity are not considered "goods." In many countries the sale of some or
all of such res is governed by special rules reflecting their special nature.
19. The Convention does not define the term "validity." but most commentators agree that its
common core includes issues regarding fraud (dol), duress, unconscionability, legal capacity of the
parties to enter into a contract, and error. See J.HONNOLD. UNIFORi LAW, s/pra note 13. at 96-98:
Schlechtrieni. UNIFoRMi S^L s LAW, supra note 13. at 32: see also Comment. Disclaimer o1flmplied
Warranties: 7/ie 1980 Uniited Nations Covention on Contracts for M/e International Sale oj'Goods,
53 FossA.t% L. Rrv. 863. 871-74 (1985) (arguing that the definition of "validity" should be found
in the domestic lass of the appropriate jurisdiction under private international law): Heiz, Va/ilitv of
Goods,
Contrac's Under the United Nations Convention o/ Contractsborthe Iniernational Scale oJ'
April /1,1980, ad Swiss Contract Law, 20 VANO. J. TRANS. L. 639 (1987) (arguing that the
Convention rather than domestic law should define the meaning of the term "validity"). Professor
Winship suggests that issues related to the validity of contracts may provide an easy door for escape
from the Convention. See Winship. Comnmentar' on Pros.sorKaeilv's Rheltoical Analrsis, 8 Nw.

J.IN'r'L
L. & Bus. 623. 635-39 (1988) thereinafter Winship. Comnimentarv'J.
20. The transfer of ownership over the thing sold is generally viewed as the basic purpose of a
Civsi. Coo- art. 1470: FRENCH Cisi',
contract of sale. See, e g.. I TALIAN

Co L art. 1583: Swiss Cow

oiFOBIGArIONS art. 184. Hiowever. there issuch diversity of rules in municipal law on this point that
unification was considered to be impossible. See Khoo. Article 3, in COMI,/:NI AR'Y..Siirai t1C 13. at 46.
21. Convention. sItpri note 3.arts. 4-5.
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application of the law of another Contracting State. 22 Thus, each Contracting
State will have two sets of rules for sales: a domestic law of sales of general
application and a set of rules applicable to a particular subgroup of salesinternational sales.
Absent a choice-of-law provision in an international sales contract, the parties
cannot be certain which law a national tribunal will apply to resolve any dispute
arising from the contract. Under the regime of the Convention, a Contracting
State's Court will not have to apply the foreign sales law indicated by the
choice-of-law rules. Instead, a Contracting State's Court will apply the Convention pursuant to the terms of article 1, unless the parties to the contract have
agreed to exclude some or all of the Convention's rules. 23 If the forum does not
belong to a Contracting State, or the requirements of article l(l)(a) of the
Convention have not been met. or the issue to be decided is not covered by, or
is expressly excluded from the scope of application of the Convention,
then the
24
case will be decided under the forum's choice-of-law rules.
22. Art. I( I )(b) of the Convention. id.. states that the Convention will also apply if the rules of
private international law (i.e.. choice-of-law) lead to application of the law of a Contracting State.
The United States and the People's Republic of China have availed themselves of the authorization
granted by art. 95 of the Convention to declare that it will not be bound by paragraph (1)(b) of art.
1. See Gabor. Stepchild of tie Net "Le. Alercatoria": Private International Law fron tile United
States Perspective. 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 538. 539 (1988) [hereinafter Gabor. Stepchildl (stating
that it was the - unsettled and unpredictable status of private international law Iwhichl prompted this
limitation").
23. Convention. supra note 3. art. 6. According to art. 1(I) of the Convention. a Contracting
State's court will apply the Convention to a contract for the international sale of goods unless the
parties affirmatively -opt out" to avoid some or all of the Convention's rules. For a discussion of the
methods to exclude the application of the Convention. see Winship. The Scope of the Vienna
Convention. stpra note 1. at 1- I. 1-32.
24. Of the several alternatives to facilitate the determination of the applicable law to international
sales, two in particular have been considered. The first solution, envisioned by adoption of the
Convention. is to have a uniform sales law in force in all countries. The second solution urges all
countries to agree on uniform choice-of-law rules rather than uniform substantive rules. If the second
solution is universally adopted. every forum would apply the same country's sales law whenever two
or more substantive laws may be applied to the case in point. But conflict-of-law rules on sales are
not uniform throughout the world. thus creating a legal uncertainty not totally excluded by the
Convention. In 1955. the Hague Conference on Private International Law (a private international law
organization not to he confused with the 1964 Conference held at the Hague which adopted ULF and
ULIS) prepared a Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods. 510 U.N.T.S.
149 (1964). This convention came into force in 1964 and was adopted by the following countries:
Belgium. Dentiark. Finland. France. Italy. Nigeria. Norvav. Sweden. and Switzerland. The
convention was not well received in the United States and failed to gain the acceptance of developing
countries. See Nadelmann. The Uniform Law on tielItternatioalStile o.f'Goods: A Conflict ol Laws
Imbroglio. 74 YM.i- L.J. 449 (1965). In 1980. the Hague Conference appointed a Special
Commission to prepare a revision of the convention to be submitted to a Special Session of the
Conference in October. 1985. The Hague Conference adopted a revised uniform choice-of-law treaty
for international sales at this extraordinary session. See Hague Conference on Private International
Las Draft. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Oct.
30 1985. 2-1 I.L.M. 1573 11985) [hereinafter Haguc Conflicts Conventioni. The Hague Conflict
Convention was a joint project of the Haguc Conference and UNCITRAL aitied at broadening the
base of participating countries. The Hague Conflict Convention mav become relevant inasmuch as
VOL. 23, NO. 2
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The delegates of the sixty-two participating nations did not adopt the final text
of the Convention by some magical consensual process.25 This is not surprising,
because adoption of the whole text of the Convention by consensus would have
been impossible in view of the wide differences held by those who participated
in the negotiations. After thirty years of hard technical negotiations, the fact that
the delegates were able to agree on a uniform law that displaces familiar national
concepts and policies can only be explained as a compromise. 26 Naturally,
gaps in the U.N. Convention for the International Sale of Goods which cannot be filled by the
Convention's general principles are to be filled by reference to the national law which would be
applicable by virtue of the forum's choice-of-law rules. See generally Gabor, Energqing Unification
ofConflict of L ws Rules Applicable to the InternationalSale ofGoods: UNCITRAL and tie New Hague
Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw, 7 NW. J.INT'I L. & Bus. 696 (1986): Gabor Stepchild. supra
note 22. at 538 (recommending that either Congress or the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C.
consider the Hague Conflict Convention as a model for the enactment in the United States of uniform
rules for the international choice of law); Mebroukine, Quelques reniarquesa'propos de li Convention
de La Haye de 1986 str laloi applicableaux contractsde vente internationalede inarchandises.Ri-vti
DE DROIT DES AFrAIRES INTERNATIONALES, No. I. 1988. at 45-71: Lando. The 1985 Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Sales, 51 RABELS ZITScHRIFr 60 (1987).
25. UNCITRAL has thirty-six rotating members allocated among the regions of the world
(Africa sends nine representatives, Asia seven. Eastern Europe five. Latin America six, and Western
Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States are jointly permitted nine). The full commission
meets once a year for sessions of two to four weeks in New York or Vienna. Its Secretariat is a
full-time body composed of an international team of professionals (mostly lawyers) with offices in
Vienna. The Secretariat chairs and prepares the annual meetings in close cooperation with the full
commission and working groups. as well as with other interested parties. For drafting technical
studies UNCITRAL depends on working groups. Each group attempts to reflect cross sections of the
commission's worldwide representation. The decisions as to what to include in the official text are
taken by the Commission. UNCITRAL's decisions take the form of recommendations and reports to
the Secretary General of the United Nations. or, as in the case of the adoption of the Convention. to
a diplomatic conference called by a General Assembly. See Farnsworth. UNCITRAL: WhY? What?
How? When?, 20 AM. J.Comp. L. 314 (1972): Herrman. Tihe Contribution of UNCITRAL to the
Development of International Trade Law, in TRANSNATIONAi LAW 0t INTERNATiONAl. COlMMERCIAl.
TRANSACTIONS 35 (N. Horn & C. Schmitthoff eds. 1982): Honnold. The United Nations Commission

on InternationalTrade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J.Comi,. L. 208 (1979): Zwart. The New
International Law oJ Sales: A MarriageBetwveen Socialist, Third World, Coinmon, and Civil Law
Principles, 13 N.C.J. IN-r'L & Cos,. RiG. 109. 113-14 (1988) [hereinafter Zwart. The New
International Law of Sales]. The Chairman of UNCITRAL recalled at its first session that the
Commission had agreed that its decisions should, as far as possible, be reached by consensus. He also
stated that it was only in the absence of consensus that decisions should be taken by a vote, as
provided for in the rules of procedure relating to the procedure of Committees of the General Assembly.
Professor Honnold reports that, as of 1979. UNCITRAL had yet to take a formal vote or adopt its
own procedural rules, noting that 'the procedures bear a striking resemblance to those of a Quaker
meeting." Honnold. supra. at 210. Professor Rosett strongly criticizes UNCITRAL's decision-making
structure, stating that the Commission "has a rather obscure structure and uncertain decisional
authority," because it possesses authority to make decisions only by reports and recommendations to
other U.N. organs. Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHio S'r. L.J. 265. 272. 295-96 (1984).
26. Rosett, supra note 25. at 296: see also Note. Unification aid CertaintY: The United Nations
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods. 97 HAsv. L. Ri:-v. 1984. 1986 (1984)
Ihereinafter Note. Unificationi and Certaintyl. defining compromise as 'merely the technical
formulation of a text whose meaning may be malleable" and consensus as *'a more basic
agreement--on either a universally accepted practice or norm or on a principal"
(footnote
omitted).
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because many of the articles of the Convention reflect a compromise, they fail to
reflect the individual preferences of the delegates and to live up to the
expectations of all participating countries.
Part I of this article discusses the need, difficulties, and willingness of
securing widespread acceptance of some of the crucial provisions of the
Convention. It also discusses the strategy of compromise followed at the Vienna
Conference in order to achieve a meaningful unification of the law governing
international sale of goods. Part II examines some of the compromises reached
by the drafters, emphasizing the technical and cultural obstacles faced in
connection with several issues presented by the law of sales. The vigorous debate
that characterized the formulation of those provisions, and the ambiguous and at
times illusory compromises ultimately reached by the drafters, provide valuable
insights into the unification process. The compromises also reveal the conceptual
gaps existing between civil law and common law legal traditions and the tensions
on matters of legislative policy between developed/developing nations and
capitalist/socialist economies. To attempt to interpret the Convention without
reference to the struggle for compromise would oversimplify the problems posed
by its application. 27
I. Need, Difficulty and Willingness to Compromise
The disparity of economic, political, and legal structure of the countries
represented at the Vienna Conference suggests the difficulty of achieving legal
uniformity. It also suggests the inevitability of compromises in order to integrate
different concepts and ideas into an independent, workable, and meaningful
system of regulating international sales. This need for compromises is unprecedented in the history of the international unification of private law.
Before the Second World War, the civil law approach was largely predominant
in the various draft rules on international sales. 28 Thus, an agreement on a
uniform sales law at the 1964 Hague Conference was not so difficult to achieve
anong industrial, capitalistic, essentially liberal European countries, in light of
the congruity of their economic, cultural, and political situations. By the time
UNCITRAL assumed the dominant role in the unification project during the late
1960's. however, the contrast between common law/civil law, capitalist/socialist,
and industrial/underdeveloped systems became the focal point of the debates.
Therefore. the text of ULIS and ULF adopted at the 1964 Hague Conference,

27. SA I . O'CoNwu. INI1irN,\sBNA1. L N\ 26 (2d ed. 1970) (suggesting the need to examine
the vital political intcrests at stake in the forlmulation of compromises in order to solve the many
problems of tireaty-application).
28. For hCI pit iUsighis into the legislative history of the Convention. stressing the practical
utility' of drawing comparisons between the Convention text and the 1964 uniform sales laws, see
Winship. ('ommtfao.v, supra note 19, at 624.
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almost entirely dominated by Western Europe, necessitated fewer compromises
than the text of the Convention adopted at the 1980 Vienna Conference. E9
The attempt to develop a compromise among radically different legal cultures
has inherent difficulties. Understandably, most delegates wanted the Convention
to embody as much as possible of their own national legal rules, either because
of the assumption that what is familiar is probably better than what is strange, or
as a result of the more pragmatic consideration that in international trade law the
law of one's own country gives those familiar with it substantial "know-how"
advantages. 3 As stated by Professor E6rsi, the search for a compromise is often
complicated by "a tacit endeavor to find a 'compromise' that favors one's own
system, ' ' 31 and some rules of the Convention reflect the inability of the
participants to the Vienna Conference to reach meaningful compromises.
Willingness to compromise, of course, is not found in equal measure in
everyone. Each country's bargaining position in the world of international trade
is likely to determine the strategy of compromise to be followed by its delegates.
On the one hand, countries that conduct an extensive international trade have less
incentive to compromise than others, partly because their multinational corpo32
rations can persuade their less powerful business partners to accept their terms
and partly because those corporations. while not completely insulated from poor
legal advice, are in a better position to retain well-informed counsel that can cope
with the intricacies of foreign law. 3 3 Countries from the "periphery" of world
trade are likely to feel driven into a corner, newcomers to the legal arena of
international business transactions that may prove even less willing, or perhaps
less able, to compromise. 34 Nevertheless, all business partners bear the risk of
29. At the 1964 Hague Conference. which adopted ULIS and ULF. twenty-eight countries took

part: twenty-two European or other developed Western countries, three Socialist. and three
developing countries. At the 1980 Vienna Conference. sixty-two countries took part: twenty-two
European and other developed Western states, eleven Socialist. eleven Central and South-American.
also Note. Tr'de
seven African and eleven Asian countries. See Ebrsi. supra note 4. at 333. 346: sete
Usages it lniernatiooal Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Stiles Conventions. 24 VA.
J.INI'L- L. 619, 636 (1984) Ihereinalter Note. Trade Usagesl.
30. E6rsi. Problems of'Unifying Law oit file Formation of'Conrocts /iiir the International Stilt,

of Goods. 27 Am. J. Coip. L. 311. 315 (1979).
31. Id.
ctrais
foi the InternationalSales o1
32. Sec, Felthai. The United Nations Conlention on Co
Goods, 1981 J. Bi s. L. 346, 361. Feltham. an English delcgate to the Vienna conference, suggests
that the Convention may not he an improvement forthe individual interests of mcrchants from
developed countries, who may be in a bargaining position strong enough to be able to impose over
the other party the application of a sophisticated law of commercial transactions.
33.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that divergent national i nterpretat ions of the Convention

may affect more severely those least able to foresee and affIord their inipact. Big multinational
corporations are more likely to benefit from the advice ofexcellent legal counsel and avoid unpleasant
surprises by "opting out" of the Convention or rcnaining tInder the Convention under a favorahle
Stil l'
oods: Hearing oilT'at\v Doc. 9 BIcore theSeniate f_'cOili. oil
foruto. See" hiternatiOl
Foreigii
Relalions.,
98th Cong.. 2d Sess. 837 (1984). at 63. 68 (joinlstatelents by Hinnold.

Kaskell. & Jclson).
34.

LEirsi. su roIniite 4. at 3-15.
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being subjected to a completely unknown legal system, so it was in the political
the Vienna Conference to act
interest of all the States that participated at
35
tolerantly and seek meaningful compromises..
Compromises can be grouped in many ways. Professor E6rsi describes four
different types of compromises, classified in accordance with their nature: (1)
those that are clear and recognizable; (2) those that are detectable only by
initiates with access to Conference documents; (3) those entered with mental
reservations on each side, each side keeping its own view of what was agreed;
and (4) those masking continuing disagreement and hence merely illusory.36 In
order to reach valuable insights as to the conceptual gaps and tensions of
legislative policy confronted by the drafter of the Convention, compromises can
also be classified according to the different perspectives given by the legal
tradition, economic system, and stage of socio-economic development. At the
risk of oversimplification, compromises may also be roughly grouped along the
conflict lines of the civil and common law tradition, socialist and western legal
systems. and industrialized and developing countries. 3 - These conflict lines are
drawn only for the purpose of facilitating the analysis of the interests at stake that
sought recognition in the formulation of the compromises. Many times,
delegates from the developing nations of Latin America sided with their civil law
brethren from the Western European industrialized countries on various technical
issues. Also the delegates of some ex-British colonies with developing economies sided in many instances with their common law brethren from the United
States, Great Britain, and other developed economies of the Commonwealth. 38
11. The Hard Task of Reconciliation: Some Representative Issues
A.

Civit.

LAW-CoMNION LAW

Despite differences of general approach and style between the Convention and
the Uniform Commercial Code, common law lawyers should have little difficulty
working with the Convention. 39 Although before the Second World War the civil

35. Id.
36. /i. at 346. 353-56: see also Note. Uni/icauion and Certainis. supra note 26. at 1988-89

(Iootnotes omitted) ("The negotiators often declined to reconcile conflicts over fundamental
principles. Instead. they sought to compromise on linguistic formulations amenable to all points of
view-fornmlations that consequently lack any determinate meaning. These compromises appeared
in several forms: a principal rule with exceptions. a rule accommodating many types of doctrines, or
a rule consisting of conflicting or at least unresolved subparts.")
L.J. 461. 463
37. Se' Farnsworth. Developing International Trade Law. 9 CALIF. W. IN''t-

1979) ("UNCITRAL operates. and this is not unusual in the United Nations. in blocks. That is, there
are groups of countries trom Africa. Asia, Latin America. Eastern Europe, and Western Europewhich includes the United States and Australia-which Work together as blocks.').
38. Eiirsi. sulyra. note 4. at 349.
39. Winship. E.port-inport Sales. suipra note 9. at 206: see also Winship. Formation of
9() Convenion, 17 IN'i LAW. I (1983) [hereinafter
International Saehs Contracts Undethe i/
Winship. oiiimationl.
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law approach was strongly predominant in the various drafts on international
sales, the common law approach gathered momentum within the Working Group
of UNCITRAL. 40 This is shown, for example, by the rejection of the traditional
dichotomy between commercial and noncommercial sales found in many civil
law countries. Yet for a common law lawyer the style of many of the rules of the
convention may appear too brief and general, in contrast with the more detailed
and convoluted drafting style prevalent in the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement of Contracts. 4' Paradoxically, for a civil law lawyer the language of
the Convention is not typical of the concise style of draftsmanship of the
French-inspired civil codes. 42 These divergent impressions confirm that the
Convention reflects more a blending
of the two legal traditions rather than the
43
prevalence of one over the other.
In preparing uniform rules for the contract of international sales, most debates
between delegates from civil and common law jurisdictions were waged over
differences in legal technique rather than economic or political issues. The
Convention's compromises to accommodate the conceptual gap between the two
major legal traditions were not surrounded by the level of political intensity
common to other more pressing, and controversial, international topics. Some of
the issues that appeared as stumbling blocks in preparing uniform rules were the
following: (a) Whether a countervalue should be required for the enforcement of
an agreement modifying or terminating a contract; (b) whether an offer should
become effective at the time of the offeree's dispatch of the acceptance or at the
time the acceptance reaches the offeror; (c) whether an offer stating a fixed
period of time for acceptance should be considered irrevocable; and (d) whether
the primary remedy for breach of a contract of sale should be specific
enforcement or substitutional relief.
1. Role of Consideration
The Convention does not mention the doctrine of consideration. This omission
is deprived of any significance because (i) a sale is an onerous transaction, where
"consideration" is supplied by the exchange of promises to deliver and to pay;
and (2) a challenge to the enforceability of a promise for lack of consideration is
40. E6rsi, supra note 30, at 315 (indicating that the prevalence of the common law approach is
also noticeable in the development of UNIDROIT'S drafts relating to commercial representation and
commission agency).
41. Peter H. Pfund. Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law. U.S. Department of
State, stated at the congressional hearings that "the Convention is generally consistent with the
approach and outlook of UCC, which it resembles more than the law of any other country." Hearings
on Treaty Doc. No. 9, supra note 10. at 2.

42. See Ghestin, Les obligations du vendeur selon la Convention de Vienne du I I avril 1980 sur
les contrats de vente internationale de ,narchandises, REVUE )E DROIT DESAFFAIRES INTERNATIONALLS,
No. 1, at 5, 6 (1988) [hereinafter Ghestin, Les obligationsdu vendeur!.
43. See Gonzalez. Remedies Under the U.N. Convention for the InternationalSale of Goods. I
INT., TA X & Bus. LAw. 79. 81 (1984) (United States influence in the drafting of the Convention
effected a change in the civil law bias on the law of international sales, thus resulting in a blending
of common and civil law systems).
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an issue of "validity" dehors the scope of application of the Convention, hence
remitted, under conflict rules, to the applicable national law. 44 It could be argued
that the doctrine of "consideration" is neglected by article 29(1), providing that
the mere agreement of the parties suffices to modify or terminate a contract. At
common law, when an agreement to modify a contract merely increases or reduces
the obligations of one of the parties, the agreement may be unenforceable since
it is not supported by "consideration"--i.e., by an act or promise given in
exchange for the new promise. 45 Civil law systems impose no comparable restriction, hence delegates from civil law countries did not object to article 29(1).
Nor did the common law delegates object, because common law restrictions on
the parties' ability to adapt their transaction to new circumstances had already
generated pressure for modifications of the traditional common law rule. 46
2. Perfection of Sale Contracts
A classic instance of theoretical conflict between common law and civil law
approaches is found in the area of formation of contracts. The classic civil law
approach is that an acceptance is not effective, hence the contract is not
perfected, until it reaches the offeror,47 thus placing the risk of transmission of
a written offer on the offeree. Because the offeree was the party that selected the
medium of communicating the acceptance, the offeree is considered in the best
position to insure against possible delays and hazards. The common law takes the
opposite view, according to which a contract is completed when the offeree
dispatches the acceptance. 4 8 Accordingly, the risk of delay or loss of the
acceptance rests on the offeror, provided the offeree dispatched the acceptance by
a medium expressly or impliedly authorized by the offeror.49

44. Convention supra note 3, art. 4(a). For comments on the Convention and the doctrine of
consideration, see Date-Bah. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods. 1980: Overview and Selective Commentar', I I REv. GH. L. 50, 59 (1979): E6rsi, supra
note 30. at 316: Lansing & Hauserman, A Comparison of the Uniforn Commercial Code to
UNCITRAL'S Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
Coi. Rio. 63, 78-79.
45. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORi LAW. supra note

13. at 229,

46. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) upholds contract modifications without consideration. See U.C.C. § 2-209(l) (1977) (a modification needs no consideration to be binding). See
generally IJ. HONNOL., UNIFORi LAW. supra note 13. at 202.
47. See, e.g., GERMAN CIVII, CODi- art. 130; Swiss FEDERAL CODE OF OLIGArIONS art. 5; see also

MFXICAN Civil COD" FORTiHEFEDERAL DisTRicr art. 1807; VF1NEZUELAN CIvIL COOE art. 1137.
48. At common law, the so-called "mailbox rule." which makes a written acceptance effective
upon dispatch. dates back to the beginning of the 19th century. See Adams v. Lindsell, I Barn & Aid.

681 (K.B. 1818). In this case, the offeror misdirected the offer, thus delaying the offeree's
acceptance. After dispatch of the acceptance, but before its receipt, the offeror had sold the goods to
a third party. Upon a claim for damages. the court ruled for the offeree because the mishap occurred
as a result of the offeror's neglect.

49. See Roset. supra note 25. at 283 (noting that the so-called "mailbox rule" raises the issue
of consideration and the traditional Anglo-American notion that contracts are bargains, according to
which a contract is perfected by the delivery of the bargained for equivalent of the promise).
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This difference of approach proved to be of minor practical consequence.
According to article 18(2) of the Convention, an offer is effective when it
reaches the offeror. 50 However, article 16(1) of the Convention provides for the
most important consequence of the common law "mail-box rule," that is, an
offer may not be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree after it has
dispatched an acceptance. 51 Thus, while receipt is crucial for the effectiveness
of the offer, dispatch remains the standard to determine the timeliness of its
revocation. Moreover, in one important situation the Convention does not
follow the receipt theory. According to article 18(3), the acceptance is effective
at the moment the offeree indicates assent by performing an act, "such as one
relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of the price." Therefore,
although the Convention adopts the receipt theory for the most part, a closer
look at the practical consequences of the provisions on the formation of contract
reveals a well-balanced compromise between civil law and common law
principles.
3. Irrevocability of an Offer with a Fixed Time for Acceptance
Most civil law systems operate under the assumption that when one makes an
offer, the offeror impliedly gives the offeree a reasonable time to consider it and
respond. Accordingly, in most civil law systems offers are presumed to be
irrevocable for a reasonable time unless otherwise indicated by the offeror. 5 2 In
contrast, the common law approach has been to grant the offeror the freedom to
53
abandon the deal until the formation process of the contract is quite advanced.
This is the general approach taken by the Convention in article 16(I), which sets
54
forth the common law presumption of revocability.
Having made a concession by agreeing on the general principle of revocability,
delegates from civil law countries urged their common law counterparts to agree
that where a businessman states in his offer a particular period during which the
offer is to remain open, the offeror should be held accountable during that period
of time. Thus, article 16(2) of the Convention carves out two important
50. The offer, the withdrawal of an offer, the revocation of an offer, and the acceptance by
declaration all become effective only when they reach the other party, Convention. supra note 3,arts.
15. 18 22-23. Art. 24 makes clear when a declaration must be presumed to have reached the
addressee. See J. HONNOID, UNIIORM LAW, supra note 13. at 186-87.

51 . For a comprchensive discussion of the Convention's provisions on formation of contracts,
providing examples of their practical consequences, see Winship, kornalion, stupra
note 39. at 14.
52. See. e.g.. GERMAN CIVIL CODt art. 147; Swiss CoDE oF OBIG(ATIONS art. 5 (offer irrevocable

during the time the offeror may reasonably expect to receive an answer): see also MEXICAN Civi. COi
FORTHE FEDERAL Dis'rRC" art. 1806: ViNiZtUiiLAN CIVIL CoDi- art. 1137.
53. See E. FARNSWORTrH, CoNrRAc-'s

§ 3.17, at

148-51 (1982);

RiSArIMi-Ni

(SECOND) OF

CONTRAcTs § 42, at 113- 15 (1979) [hereinafter RsiATENI-i CONiRAC'iS]. The offeror's freedom to
revoke an offer enjoyed at common law has been limited by open-ended doctrines such as promissory
estoppel. See e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977): N.Y. GEN. OILo. LAW § 5- 1109.
54. Convention. sulpra
note 3,art. 16(I): "Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked
if the revocation reaches the offerce
before he has dispatched an acceptance."
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restrictions to the general principle of revocability. First, it provides that an offer
is irrevocable "if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or
otherwise, that it is irrevocable." Second, offers on which the offeree has acted
in reliance are also irrevocable. 55
The first exception from the general rule of revocability provoked extended
discussions at the 1978 session of UNCITRAL. One delegation from a
common law jurisdiction urged that when the offer states a fixed period for
acceptance, businessmen of common law countries would interpret this to
mean not only that the offer would terminate at the end of this period, but also
that during this period the offer was revocable at any time. 56 This observation
is consistent with traditional common law principles, according to which an
offer may be revoked until it is accepted unless the offeree has paid
consideration. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes
between a firm offer, which cannot be revoked, and a merely open offer,
57
which lapses at the end of the stated time but can be revoked at any time.
This distinction has not been adopted in most civil law countries, where every
.open offer" is a "firm offer" simply because it expressly states that it is
irrevocable or implicitly indicates so by stating a fixed period for acceptance.
When a delegation from a civil law jurisdiction answered that such a peculiar
reading of an open offer would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of
article 16(2)(a), another delegate from a common law country replied that in
the relations between the businessmen of two common law States, the
meaning they give to their own contract must be respected. 58
The language adopted in article 16(2)(a) is described in the summary of
UNCITRAL deliberations as a compromise, but its drafting history indicates that
at least two interpretations of this provision are possible. For a civil law lawyer
it is obvious that if a fixed time for acceptance of the offer is stated, as provided

55. Id. art. 16(2). See generallv Winship, Formation. supra note 39, at 7.
56. See E6rsi. supra note 30, at 321 (citing U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/XI. CRP. 18, add. 9, para. 5).
57. Section 2-205 of the UCC provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms
gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration,
during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assurance on
a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
58. Edrsi, supra note 30, at 321: E6rsi. supra note 4, at 354; see also Date-Bah. supra note 44,
at 58:
At the Plenipotentiary Conference, some of the common law delegations suggested
that in a transaction between traders from common law countries in which the offeror
fixed a time for lapse of the offer and was so understood by the offeree not to have
made an irrevocable offer, this would be a situation where the stating in an offer of a
fixed time for its acceptance could not be interpreted by a reasonable court to mean
that the offer was irrevocable. This result could easily be reached by a common law
court: but it is to be doubted whether a civil law court would come to this conclusion.
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under article 16(2)(a), this indicates that the offer is irrevocable until the
expiration' of the stated period, though not thereafter. For a common law lawyer,
the time fixed for acceptance only means that an answer has to be given within
this period; more precise language would be necessary to make the offer
irrevocable.
Therefore, the compromise solution of article 16(2)(a) does not bridge the
gap between common law and civil law conceptions on the irrevocability of
offers that state a fixed time for acceptance; the compromise only covers it up.6 °
The offer is not likely to be treated as irrevocable when a trader in one common
law country states a fixed time for acceptance to a trader in another common law
country, 6 1 but it will be deemed irrevocable if the parties are from civil law
countries. 62 Should each party belong to a different legal tradition, then the
irrevocability of the offer must be ascertained under a closer analysis of the
language of the parties' communications and the volitional contest in which
they were made. 63 Obviously article 16(2)(a) is not likely to help the parties in

59. The different viewpoints on this provision are summarized in Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Laus on the work of its eleventh session (New York 30 May-16
June 1973). 119781, 9 UNCITRAL Y.B. 41 U.N. DOC. A/CN. 9/SER.A/(1978):
§ 135. In support of this proposal [the compromise text ultimately adopted in art.
16(2)(a)]. it was stated that the principal test to determine that an offer could not be
revoked was whether the offer indicated that it was irrevocable. Whether the offer was
irrevocable could be determined by the fact that it stated a fixed time for acceptance
or otherwise. However, the mere fact of stating a time for acceptance would not
automatically lead to the result that the offer was irrevocable if. under the circumstances of the case, such a result was not intended. In particular, it was said, where
a merchant from one common law country made an offer to a merchant from atother
common law country, the fixing of a time for acceptance without more would not
indicate that the offer was irrevocable.
§ 136. However, there was considerable support for the view that the interpretation placed on the
words of the text by its proposers was unjustified. It was considered that this text clearly adopted the
rule that, if the offer stated a fixed time for acceptance, it automatically was irrevocable.
§ 137. The Commission decided to accept the wording of the compromise proposal ...
60. Eorsi, supra note 4, at 355.
6 I. The parties' communications, of course, must be examined in light of their course of dealing
and usage of trade. Convention. supra note 3. arts. 8, 9. Moreover. under art. 16(2)(b), the offer will
be deemed irrevocable if the offeree reasonably believed the offer was irrevocable and acted in
reliance on this belief. Winship. Fornation, supra note 39. at 8-9. See also EOrsi. supra note 4, at
356 (stating that subparagraphs (a) and (b) of art. 16(2) are not two different cases of irrevocability,
but (a) expresses 'continentally" when the common law "reliance doctrine" incorporated in (b) may
come into action).
62. See Feltham, supra note 32. at 352.
63. See generallv Winship, Formation. supra note 39. at 8 (furnishing an example where the
offeror used the word ''lpse" while fixing a time for acceptance, thus inferring that the offeror did
not intend to make an irrevocable offer because the word "lapse" at common law merely refers to
an "open" offer and not to one intended to be irrevocable). But see Ebrsi. supra note 30, at 321
(indicating that an offer which states the time for acceptance must be deemed irrevocable regardless
of the parties' subjective intent, because art. 7 of the Convention requires that it be interpreted with
due regard to "the need to promote uniformity").
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a specific situation by indicating when it is too late to withdraw from an offer,
for which reason this compromise has been strongly criticized. 64 This is a clear
example of a "compromise" entered into with mental reservations on each
side, each one keeping its own view on what was agreed.
4. Specific Performance
The disparity between civil law and common law traditional perceptions to the
law of sales was particularly evident in the field of remedies. 65 Two remedies
uncharacteristic of the common law found their place in the Convention with
little opposition from common law delegates. First, the Convention allows either
buyer or seller, on delay of the other, to "fix an additional period of time of
reasonable length of performance of the [other] of his obligations. 66 Failure of
67
the other to meet such a reasonable deadline is then grounds for termination.
Second, the Convention allows the buyer unilaterally68 to reduce the price of
nonconforming goods to the degree of the deficiency.
The Convention's provisions more startling to the common law lawyer's
traditional perception of remedies are those concerning specific performance.
Article 46 confers on the buyer the right to demand specific performance of the
seller's obligations to deliver the goods and the documents and transfer
ownership over the goods. Article 62 entitles the seller to require the buyer to
pay the price and take delivery or perform his other obligations. The right to
demand specific performance is not conditional on the inadequacy of damages.
Thus, in theory, the Convention assumes that specific performance will be more
64. Rosett, supra note 25, at 291-92 (pointing out that "identification of the moment in the
course of negotiation at which it is too late to turn back produces the most significant variations in
attitudes toward formation"). Rosett adds. id. at 292:
The question of intention and of indications of intention raises the whole problem of
cultural expectations about which no worldwide agreement exists. As a result, the
provisions of the Convention defining an offer and its revocability are unclear. This
indefiniteness is not due solely to the lack of clarity or conflicting nature of the terms
of the Convention. but to the fact that different parties continue to entertain conflicting
understandings of what the terms mean.
65. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 79; Stem, A Practitioner'sGuide to the United
Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 81 (1983).
66. Convention, sul)ra note 3. art. 47 (buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for the seller to deliver) and art. 63 (seller may extend the time for the buyer to pay the price
or take delivery).
67. Convention. supra note 3, art. 49(1)(b) (for buyer): art. 64(l)(b) (for seller). If buyer or
seller fails to comply within this additional period, the other may withdraw from the contract without
regard to whether the breach is fundamental. Without such an extra time, a party may withdraw only
for "'fundamental breach," a concept which is defined in art. 25 of the Convention.
68. Convention, supra note 3, art. 50. Under Roman law a seller was only liable for damages
if he was guilty of fault or fraud, which could not be imputed to the seller for delivering
nonconforming goods. To prevent the seller's unjust enrichment, Roman law developed the action for
the reduction of price (quanti ininoris). Under similar circumstances, the buyer's remedies at
common law are limited to damages. See generally Bergsten & Miller, The Remnedv of Reduction of
Price, 27 A,,i. J. Comp. L. 225, 272. 275 (1979).
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readily available than substitutional relief. 69 This is consistent with the traditional
preference of civil law systems for specific relief 7° and with the economic needs
of countries with planned economies that lack markets for substitute
transactions. 7' For largely historical reasons, the right to obtain specific
performance is uncongenial to common law lawyers, 72 who sought a compromise
73
solution satisfactory to their legal tradition and alleged economic needs.
By way of compromise, article 28 provides that neither the buyer nor the seller
are entitled to specific performance unless the court would do so under the law
of the forum in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by the
Convention. This provision ensures that common law courts will not have to
abandon their traditional position at the cost of uniformity, although it would not,
of course, protect a party from a common law country against the granting of
specific performance by a court in a civil law country. Because the draftsmen of
the Convention were unable to agree on a uniform substantive rule, an action for
69. Arts. 46 and 62 of the Convention, supra note 3, expressly limit the right to specific
performance to cases of fundamental breach, or where the aggrieved party has resorted to an
inconsistent alternative remedy (e.g.. if the buyer has "'reduced the price" under art. 50 or has
declared the contract avoided under art. 49). See Kastely, The Right to Require Perfijrmance in
International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 607, at 617-24 (1988) [hereinafter Kastely. The Right to Require Perjbrmancel (suggesting that
art. 7 implicitly requires that the right to performance be exercised in good faith); Ullen, The
Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Micii L. REv.
341, 390-93 (1984) [hereinafter Ullen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance] (noting that art. 77.
interpreted as a general duty to mitigate damages, imposes an additional limitation on the right to
performance).
70. See generally Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MicH. L. REv. 495
(1959); Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 AM. J.CoMp. L. 208, 233
(1955); Treitel, Specific Performance in the Sale of Goods. 1966 Bus. L. 211. It should be noted,
however, that the rules on specific performance differ widely even among civil law jurisdictions. See
generallv Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved),
in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OFCOMPARATIVE LAW ch. 16, § 12 (1976); G.H. TREIrEL, REMEDIES
FOR BREACH OF CONrRACr 43-75 (1988).

71. See generallv 1. SZASZ, THE CMEA UNIFORM LAW FORINTERNATIONAL SALES 167 (2d ed. 1985);
Comment, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the General
Conditions for the Sale of Goods, 12 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 451. 457 (1982).
72. See generallv E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 829-30 (1982); Farnsworth, Damages and Specific
Relief, 27 AMER. J. Cop. L. 247, 250-51 (1979). Although the contemporary advantage of
substitutional relief has been placed on -fundamental notions of economics" rather than history, not
all economists agree that specific performance involves the inefficient use of economic resources. See
Schwartz, The Case Jor Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Ullen, The Efficiencv of
Specific Perbrmnance, supra note 69, at 341; see also Kastely, The Right to Require Performance,
supra note 69, at 629 ("ITihe most persuasive conclusion is that specific performance may be the
most efficient remedy, even where alternative goods are available to the buyer."). Bat see Ziegel, The
Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Comnnion Law Perspectives, in
INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 13, § 9.03, at 9- 10 ("To a common law mind it may seem puzzling
that civilians are still so attached to a remedy that is inefficient economically, at any rate in those
cases where damage would adequately compensate the buyer").
73. Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 Au. J.COMp. L. 247, 249 (1979) (characterizing the language of art. 26 of the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft as a -'sham compromise" and asking for
the adoption of art. VII of ULIS. which was later carried forward in art. 28 of the Convention).
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specific performance will depend on the vagaries of the forum's law. 7 4 This was
a clear compromise impairing the unification of law, 7 5 although not recognizable
as a compromise by a simple reading of the general provisions on the seller's and
buyer's remedies.
B.

EAST-WEST

The approach of socialist legal systems towards the law of sales reflects the
requirements of a planned, state-operated economy. Accordingly, the socialist
76
view gives priority to security of contract and foreseeability over other values.
In contrast, Western legal systems prefer flexible standards that would allow the
parties to adjust the contract without judicial interference. 77 Since trade law
among COMECON countries inter se is unified, 78 however, most socialist
74. Professor Honnold notes that the availability of specific performance is mostly academic in
international sales transactions. since practical businessmen areunlikely to spend time and money in
expensive transnational litigation to enforce international sales contracts. See J.HONNOLD, UNIFORM
LAW. supra note 13. at 24: see also Winship. E.port-hlnport Sales, supra note 9, at 209: Reinhart.
Development of a Law for the International Sale of Goods, 14 CuMB. L. REv. 89. 98-99 (1984).
However. the uncertainty regarding the right to specific performance caused by art. 28 may result in
unfairness in those cases where the aggrieved party would prefer full performance. See Kastely.
Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J.
INI'n, L. & Bus. 574. 615 (1988) [hereinafter Kastely, Unification and Community ("[Slince Article
28 makes the availability of specific performance dependent on the law of the forum, parties will be
encouraged to forum-shop for a national court system that will or will not grant specific
performance."): Kastely. 77te
Right to Require Perforniance, supra note 69. at 627 ("Because parties
at the time of a breach will not know whether the right to performance will eventually be enforced.
it will be very difficult or them to evaluate and to settle informally their mutual rights and
obligations.").
75. See Kastely. Tite Right to Require Pert brfoance, supra note 69, 627-37 (arguing that none
of the reasons given by the delegates from the United States and the United Kingdom in favor of
allowing their courts to apply domestic law regarding the remedy of specific performance justifies the
abandonment of the Convention's goal of uniformity): Kastely, Unification anid Comnmunit supra
note 74. at 615 (pointing out that the compromise forced by some common law countries "tends to
portray the member states as petty. nationalistic, and capable of wielding inequitable influence."):
see also Drobnig. General Principles of Contract Law, in DUBROVNIK LECTURES, supra note 13. at
305. 319-22.
76. Edrsi. snupra note 4. at 342: Roset. supra note 25. at 285 ("the representatives of centrally
planned, authoritarian economies [are not] likely to place great value on private autonomy, the right
of parties to opt out of legal regimes by contract, or opportunities for informal, unwritten
contracts"). The substantial difference between the Convention and the uniform law among several
socialist states is discussed in Comment, The Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of
Goods and tire
General Conditions fir the Sale of Goods, 12 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 451 (1982).
77. E6rsi, supra note 4. at 343 ("Not that Western lawyers would deliberately seek practical
vagueness rather than security: what they prefer is practical Western flexibility to socialist rigidity.
with its bureaucratic means and methods ). Professor Ebrsi notes that it does not make sense, from
a legal standpoint, toregard one approach as better than the other, since rules of law are determined
by the economic models that lie behind them.
78. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was formed in 1949 as the east
bloc counterpart to the Western European countries which became united under the Marshall plan. Its
members consist of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states, plus Albania,
Mongolia. Cuba. and Vietnam. Standardization of contract terms within the Soviet block was
VOL. 23. NO. 2

RECONCILIATION OF LEGAL TRADITIONS

461

countries were willing to adjust to Western practice insofar as their trade with
Western countries. 79 The confrontation between Socialist and Western legal
systems centered on four issues: (a) Whether the written form should be
compulsory for the enforcement of a contract for the sale of goods; (b) whether
a contract should come into being if the terms of the acceptance differ from the
offer; (c) whether a contract should come into being if neither the price nor the
way of quoting it is fixed in the contract and (d) whether contracts should be not
only performed and enforced but also formed in good faith.
1. Writing Requirement
Most Western legal systems have abandoned the requirement of a writing for
the sale of movable property. Because most delegates felt that writing requirements interfere with the necessary speed of commercial transactions, article II
of the Convention states that a contract of sale need not be in writing and may
be proved by any means, including witnesses. Because many socialist legal
systems require a writing for a binding contract, however, article 96 permits States
that require contracts of sale to be evidenced by a writing to declare article II
inapplicable. 80 By availing itself of this "statute of frauds" reservation, a Contracting State will apply ordinary choice of law rules to determine whether a
writing is necessary. 8' This was a clear-cut compromise taking the form of a
82
declaration allowed by the Final Provisions of the Convention.
established in 1958 with the adoption of the "COMECON General Conditions." See generally
T. HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE. COMECON LAW. AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE 4 (1984).

79. COMECON expressed general support for the Convention in March of 1983. See Vienna
Convention for Sale of Goods Gets Strong Backing, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA). No. 17, at 728
(Aug. 16, 1983). The delegates of most of the COMECON countries represented in Vienna were
generally satisfied with the text of the Convention. The COMECON countries do not need the
Convention for their mutual relations, but the Convention bears interest to them as an instrument of
unification of sales law which may facilitate transactions with their main non-COMECON trading
partners. See Maskow, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Perspective of
the Socialist Countries, in LA VENDITA INTERNATIONALE. LA CONVENZIONE Dt VIENNA DELL' I I APRIL:
1980 at 40, 46 (A. Giuffr ed. 1981) [hereinafter LA VENDITA INTERNATIONALEI.

80. The representative of the Soviet Union argued in particular that the preservation of domestic
law requiring written documentation in international sales contracts was critical to protect established
practices within the Soviet government for the approval and completion of foreign trade agreements.
See Analysis ofReplies and Comments by Governments on Hague Conventions of 1964: Report of the
Secretory-General. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/31, reprinted in [ 19701 1 Y.B. U.N. COMM'N ONINT'. TRADEL. 159, 170: see also J. HONNOLD, UNIFORI LAW. supra note 13. § 128.
81. The law of the declaring state does not automatically supersede the law of the nondeclaring
state, but the parties to an international sales contract cannot agree to be bound by an oral
modification if any party has its principal place of business in a Contracting State that has preserved
its own statute of frauds under art. 96. See Convention, supra note 3. art. 12.
82. It has been reported that the Soviet representatives were more interested in the reservation
as to the written requirement than the delegates from other socialist countries. The United States
supported some deference to national law on the requirement for of a writing, apparently for the
purpose of reaching a compromise with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitations on
specific performance finally embodied in art. 28 of the Convention. See Report ofSecretar'v-General:
Analy'sis qj Cotnnents by Governments and InternationalOrganizations on Droll Convention on
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2. Binding Effect of an Acceptance that "Deviates" from the Offer
Mismatches between the terms of offer and acceptance are resolved differently
by the legal systems. Not surprisingly, opinions diverged widely over this issue.
Most delegates, including those from socialist countries, thought that an acceptance must be in complete agreement with the offer, so that the contract cannot
83
come into being if the terms of the acceptance differ from those of the offer.
Because the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code have retreated from
this "mirror-image" rule, delegates from common law countries were of the
opinion that contemporary practices require that a contract84 be concluded unless
the acceptance "materially" alters the terms of the offer.
Attempting to bridge the gap between these two perspectives, article 19(1) of
the Convention opens with the classic general rule that if the purported
acceptance makes any addition or modification to the offer, the "acceptance"
will operate as a rejection and counter offer. As a compromise solution, article
19(2) lays down an important exception to this general principle. Where
exchanged forms do not match, a contract is nonetheless concluded if the
alterations do not "materially alter" the terms of the offer, unless the offeror
prevents the formation of the contract by objecting. Because many thought that
the words "materially alter" were too vague, a third paragraph was added to
article 19, introducing a very narrow definition of "materiality." ' 85 Thus, the
continued life of the contract is preserved in spite of a minor mismatch. This was
a fair compromise between the strict socialist view that an acceptance that
deviates from the offer amounts to a rejection, and the more flexible view of

International Sale of Goods as Adopted by the Working Group on International Sale of Goods. U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/126. reprinted in 119771 8 Y.B. U.N. COMM'N ONINT'L TRADE L. 142, 150; see also

Maskow. supra note 79, at 53 (noting that in the German Democratic Republic the written
requirement is prescribed only for plant contracts and contracts on mercantile agency, and for certain
clauses and declarations): Kastely, Unification and Communitv, supra note 74, at 616, n. 187; E6rsi,
General Principles, INTERNATIONAL SALES. supra note 13, at 2-32.

83. E6rsi. slpra note 4. at 342.
84. UCC § 2-207(2)(b) (an additional term in the acceptance becomes part of the contract
between merchants unless it materially alters the offer). See also RESTATEMENr CONTRACTS, supra

note 42, § 69 (1979) (where the acceptance is not conditional, the acceptance is effective and the
additional or different terms are to be construed as proposals for modification of the contract). See
generally Honnold. The New Uniform Law for InternationalSales and the U.C.C.: A Comparison,

18 INT"L LAW. 21. 26 (1984): Comment, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
InternationalSale of Goods: Contract Formation and Battle of Forms. 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 529 (1983): Comment. Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts

for the International Sale of Goods and tle Uniform Commercial Code, 3 DicK. J. INT'L L. 107
(1984).
85. Under Convention. supra note 3, art. 19(3), terms relating to price, payment, quality, place
and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability, and settlement of disputes, are all deemed
material. Only minor variations, such as changing designation of the vessel, or packaging of the
goods are nonmaterial. See Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note
13, § 3-04. at 3-16.
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Western countries that considers the contract as concluded if the acceptance
contains minor additions or limitations.
3. Open Price Terms
Socialist countries objected to the conclusion of contracts with open price
terms, because the parties are expected to conform their contracts to a
predetermined macroeconomic governmental plan. 86 This view makes sense in a
planned economy, in which contracts with open price terms are a nullity from the
perspective of the superintending state planning agency. Also in some civil law
systems contracts of sale with open price terms are viewed with hostility,
particularly when the unilateral fixing of the price works to the disadvantage of
the weaker party. 87 It was also argued at the Vienna Conference that contracts
with open price terms do not serve the interests of the developing countries as a
result of the unfavorable terms of trade for raw materials, in contrast with the
ever-increasing price of manufactured goods. 88 In contrast, the policy prevailing
in the United States on this matter encourages the conclusion of sales contracts
for long-term supplies, leaving the price and quantity of goods open to be
adjusted in light of sellers' output and buyers' requirements. 89
In order for a proposal to enter into a contract of sale to be deemed
"sufficiently definite," article 14(1) of the Convention (under the formation
86. Rosett, supra note 25, at 289.
87. See Rosett, supra note 25, at 289 n. 80; UNIFORM SALES LAW. supra note 13. at 51 n.166.
referring to judgments of the French Court of Cassation in which open-price contracts have been
invalidated. Under French law a contract of sale where the indication as to the price is not definite
is null and void. See FRENCH CIvIL CODE arts. 1129, 1583, 1591. See generallv B. STARCK, DROlT
CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS § 1399 (1973), referring to the case law of the French Court of Cassation on this
matter; Corbisier, La ditermination du prix dans les contrats commerciaux portant vente de
marchandises, Rflexions comparatives, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DEDROIT COMPARE 767, 826-29
(1988) (discussing the issue of price certainty from a comparative perspective and under the
Convention).
88. See Date-Bah. The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from the Perspective of the
Developing Countries, in LA VENDrrA INTERNAZIONALE, supra note 79, at 28:
If a contract can be formed without an agreement on price, this would create the
danger of buyers being landed, after vague negotiations, with sales contracts whose
contract prices would be imposed by the courts: many such courts would be in the
developed countries and could impose unreasonably high prices for manufactured
goods. Such contract prices would tend to be the sellers' prices and, as is well-known.
while the prices of the raw materials exported by the developing countries are
generally fixed in the commodity markets of the developed world, the prices of
manufactured goods are usually determined by the manufacturers themselves.
89. Although open-price contracts were subject to attack at common law. U.C.C. §§ 2-305,
2-306 explicitly authorizes contracts with open price terms as well as output and requirement
contracts. U.C.C. § 2-305 provides: "The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
" See Rosett, supra note 25, at 288 n. 79; Farnsworth,
delivery if nothing is said as to price ..
supra note 85. § 3.04, at 3-8; see also U.C.C. § 2-204 (3): "Even though one or more of the terms
are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make
a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
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section) requires the offeror to fix the price, expressly or implicitly. The United
States delegation was unsuccessful in attempting to change this language in favor
of "open price" offers. 9o An uneasy compromise was finally reached, not by
amending article 14(l) but by inserting a new provision in article 55 (under the
section dealing with the obligations of the buyer). 9 ' This provision seems to say
the opposite of what is stated in article 14(1), for it implies that a contract may
not expressly or implicitly fix or
be "validly concluded" even though it "does
92
make provision for determining the price.''
American legal scholars who participated in the diplomatic negotiations
disagree about the interpretation of article 55. On the one hand, Professor
Honnold believes that a contract with an unstated price may be validly
concluded. 9 3 On the other hand, Professor Farnsworth thinks that article 55 is an
empty set since it applies, according to its opening clause, only in cases "where
a contract has been validly concluded," and if there is no reference to the price
there can be no offer, hence no valid contract could have been concluded. 94 1 am
in favor of Honnold's opinion for two reasons. The first one is that in a codified
set of rules such as the Convention, every effort should be made to construe
seemingly incompatible provisions in order to make sense out of them. The other
reason is that it is conceivable and even plausible to reconcile their meaning.
Whereas article 14(1) requires that the price be at least "implicitly" fixed,

90. See Farnsworth, supra note 85, § 3.04. at 3-8. Article 14(l) of the Convention. supra note
3. had already been approved when art. 55 was discussed, and the former provision could only be
vendeur,
modified by a qualified majority, which could not be raised. See Ghestin. Les obligationsdiu
supra note 42. at 6.
91. Convention. supra note 3, art. 55, provides:
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix
or make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence

of any indication to the contrary. to have impliedly made reference to the price
generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold
under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned.
92. The adoption of art. 55 eventually responded to the desire of the Scandinavian countries to
accept Part I of the Convention without Part If. and to have a provision in Part 11in case the price
has not been determined. I U.N. OrticlAL RECORDS. supra note 24, at 45. See UNtIORM SALES LAW.
stlwa note 13. at 51:E6rsi. Article 55. in COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 407: see also Rosett supra
note 25. at 289 ("The language of this article 1551 appears directly keyed to article 14(1) and seems
to undercut the earlier provision-).
93. J. HONNOLD. UN:orsi LAW. supra note 13. at 163-64 (arguing that failure to state a fixed
price does not contravene the requirement of definiteness in art. 14).
94. Farnsworth. supra note 85. § 3.04. at 3-9: see also Rowe. U.N. Conventio ot
International Sales Law,INT'L FIN. L. Rrv.. July 1983. at 20. 21: Rosett, supra note 25, at 289 n.81;
Eirsi. Artice 14, in CoMsislNIArv. supra note 13. at 144 ("As there is no offer without an indication
of the price. a contract without such an indication seems to be a manifest contradiction."). See also
Date-Bah. The Perspective of the Developing Countries. supra note 88, at 28. Professor Date-Bah
recalls that several delegations sought unsuccessfully to delete the second sentence of art. 14 (I), so
that an offer could be held sufficiently definite even ifit did not expressly or impliedly fix the price
or make provision for determining the price. Date-Bah concludes that the implication to be drawn by
the interpreter from the motion's defeat is that there can be no valid 'open price" contract under the
text of art. 14 (I). as it now stands.
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article 55 indicates that a contract with an open price is actually a contract with
an "implicit" price fixed by operation of law, i.e., the price "generally charged
at the time of the conclusion of the contract." 95 In a period of rapid price
fluctuation, however, it is to be expected that if a controversy under the
Convention arises in the courts of a country that is not receptive to open price
contracts, the wording of article 14(1) 96and a narrow construction of article 55
may lead to the nullity of the contract.
4. Good Faith
It is widely acknowledged that "good faith" has multiple connotations within
a single domestic legal system and various meanings in different legal systems, 97
so it was feared that there could be no general agreement on what "good faith"
might mean in international transactions. 98 The requirement of "good faith" turns
up not only in the civil codes of civil law systems but also in statutory and case-law
of common law systems. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith is only
required in the performance and enforcement of contracts, 9 9 whereas in many civil
law systems the principle as such is expressly stated with respect not only to
95. Some commentators attempt to reconcile arts. 14 (1) and 55 of the Convention, supra note
3, on the ground that the former provision is concerned with offers and the latter 55 with contracts.
According to this view, once a contract is concluded, the offer becomes irrelevant and the conclusion
of the contract in itself proves that the offer was sufficiently definite, irrespective of whether a
provision was made for determining the price. The conclusion of these authors is that art. 55 has
precedence over art. 14 (1). Ebrsi, Article 55, in COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 407 ("An approach
which concentrates on the offer is no longer appropriate after the contract has been concluded.");
UNIFORM SALES LAW, supra note 13, at 51, 80. Contra. Ghestin, Les obligations du vendeur. supra

note 42, at 6 ("A priori, la question de validit6 dtant prdalable A celle de I'exdcution. l'article 14
devrait pr~valoir sur l'article 55, qui suppose d'ailleurs express6ment que la vent ait t6 'valablement
conclue'. Mais la Convention de Vienne refuse express6ment de rdgler les questions de validite.").
96. See Farnsworth, supra note 85. § 3.04, at 3-9; see also Tallon, The Buyer's Obligations
under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. in INTERNATIONAL SALES,
supra note 13, § 7-03, at 7-9; Niggemann, Les obligations de l'acheteur sous la Convention des
Nations Unies sur les contrats de vente internationale de ,narchandises, I REVUE DE DROIT DES
AFFAIRES INTERNATIONAL ES 27, 33 (1988) [hereinafter Niggemann, Les obligations de lacheteurl.
97. See Rosett. supra note 25, at 290, who characterizes the wide connotation of the principle
of good faith thus:
At the very least, good faith is an interpretative tool that precludes a party from unduly
rigorous insistence on the right to terminate after a minor deviation in performance by
the other. Viewed somewhat more expansively, it imports affirmative obligations on
the parties to communicate during performance and to cooperate in the cure of defects
and the modification of obligations in unforeseen circumstances. It precludes a perfect
tender approach to interpretation of the seller's obligations of delivery and does not
treat minor deviations by either side as an event that terminates the contract.
In continental and socialist systems, the concept may have broader connotations. In particular, the
notion of good faith is not limited to the performance of completed agreements, but extends to the
process of formation (footnote omitted).
98. Edrsi, supra note 4, at 349 ("[lilt was widely thought that the rule was vague, or at least
would remain vague for a long time and, because of the laconic language [of the Convention], would
never become unambiguous.").
99. U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement"). See also RESTATEMENT CON] RACTS,supra note 53 § 231.
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performance of obligations, but also to pre-contractual bargaining, the formation
and interpretation of contracts. 100 Not surprisingly, the inclusion in the Convention of a provision creating an obligation of good faith was the occasion for
extensive and at times obscure disputes not only between socialist and capitalistic
representatives, but also between common law and civil law delegates and even
among representatives who shared a common cultural and legal background.
Opinions on the role to be played by good faith ranged from the idea that it should
be viewed as an obligation present at all stages of the contracting process to the
view that good faith should not be explicitly mentioned in any provision.
As early as the Hague Diplomatic Conference in 1964, explicit reference to
good faith as a general principle was opposed by the French delegate. Professor
Tunc asserted that the principle of good faith might lead to divergent and even
arbitrary interpretations by national courts, and thus would impair uniformity. 01
At the 8th session of the UNCITRAL Working Group, the Hungarian delegate
proposed the insertion of a "good-faith clause" directing the parties to act in
good faith in the formation of international sales contracts. 102 Some delegates
opposed the insertion of the "good faith" provision on grounds that it was vague
and unnecessary. 103 Especially unacceptable to the common law delegates was
that the principle of good faith should also cover the formation of contracts.'04

100. ITALIAN CIVIL CODE arts. 1137. 1366, 1375: GERMAN CIVIL CODE arts. 157, 242: ARGENTINE
CIVIL CODE art. 1198 (as amoended by Law No. 17711 of 1968).
101. 1 THE HAGUE RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ONTHE UNIFICATION OF

LAW GOVERNING THE INTrERNATIONAL SALE OFGooos 100 (April 2-25. 1964), cited by E6rsi, supra note
4. at 348. As recalled by Efirsi. the ULF requires good faith in the setting of revocation of an offer.
Art. 5(2) of the ULF provides that an offer "can be revoked unless the revocation is not made in good
faith or in conformity with fair dealing." E6rsi. supra note 30. at 314 n. 13.
102. The Hungarian proposal read: "'In the course of the formation of the contract the parties must
observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good faith." Report of the Working Group ontthe
InternationolSale ofGoods ot the Work of Its Ninth Session. § 70. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/142 (1977).
reprinted in 119781 Y.B. U.N. COMNI"N ON INT'L TRADE L. 61, 66.

103. Proponents of the "good faith" principle replied that such general clauses were of necessity
vague and yet were indispensable in modem law. They added that, in most cases, one knew what
conduct was inconsistent with good faith, and that if the experience with such rule in a domestic
setting had shown that even vague provisions may be clarified by judicial development, a similar
development could be expected at the international level. In reply. the opposition noted that judicial
development at the international level, by a variety of forums, was incomparably more difficult than
within the framework of a single national jurisdiction. A third group of delegates thought that the
duty to act in good faith went without saying, hence it was unnecessary to include it. A fourth group
suggested that a duty of good faith made no sense unless accompanied by sanctions for breach of the
duty. See Report oftthe Seeretarn-General: Analvtic l Compilation of Cottents b Governments and
International Organizations ot the Drop' Convention ot the Formtation of Contracts f1r the
InternationalSale of Goods (is Adopted bs the Working Group ot the Iternational Sale of Goods.
§§ 64-79. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/146 and addenda 1-4 (19878). reprinted in 119781 9 Y.B. U.N.
CoMSt'N ON INr'L TRADIE L. 127, 132-33. See also E6rsi. supra note 30, at 314: Winship,
Coninttetrov. supra note 19. at 631-32.

104. See E.

FARNSWOR I;,. PROBLsMS OF TIlE UNIFICATION OF SAi.ES LAW FROMTHE STANDPOINT OF THE

COMMON LAW COLIrRiEs
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The principle of good faith gained acceptance in the text of the Draft Convention
and even survived the 9th session of UNCITRAL,10 5 but a counterattack was
launched at the 10th session in 1978. 106
In view of these sharply divided opinions, a compromise was finally reached
in article 7(1) providing that the Convention must be interpreted taking into
account the "observance of good faith in international trade." 0 7 By relegating
the relevance of good faith to the interpretation of the Convention, a hard-won
settlement was reached between those who would have preferred a provision
imposing directly on the parties the duty to act in good faith during the
formation, performance, and termination of the contract of sale, and those who
were opposed to any explicit reference to the principle of good faith. This peculiar
compromise, actually burying the principle of good faith, has been characterized
as "uneasy," 108 "strange," 1o9 and as a "statesmanlike compromise." ''0 Almost
the principle of good faith). Report submitted to the Colloquium on Problems of the Unification of
International Sales Law held in Postdam-Babelsberg, August 21-24, 1979, sponsored by the
International Association of Legal Science (IALS).
105. Art. 5 of the UNCITRAL Working Group's 1977 Draft Convention provided: "In the course
of the formation of the contract the parties must observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good
faith." The delegate from the Federal Republic of Germany thought that the appearance of the
principle of good faith in the UNCITRAL draft was a clear step forward. Huber. Der UncitralEntwurf eines Ubereinkommens uber internationale Warenkaufl'erage, 43 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT lRabelsZI 413. 430 (1979).
106. The motion to introduce the principle of good faith in the formation of contracts was
approved by a slight majority of the Working Group, but it was rejected (again by a slight majority)
by UNCITRAL. See Eorsi. supra note 30, at 314. After extensive debate UNCITRAL decided to
refer the provision to a small working group to draft a compromise. Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law oilthe Work of Its Eleventh Session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp.
Annex I (No. 17) §§ 42-60, U.N. Doc. A/33/17 (1978). reprinted in 19781 9 YB. U.N. CO1M'N Ox
I,vr'L
TRADE L. II,35-36; J. HONNOLD. UNIFORM LAW, supra note 13. at 123-24: Winship.
CommentarY, supra note 19, at 631-32.
107. Convention, supra note 3, art. 7(l), second paragraph ("In the interpretation of this
Convention regard is to be had . . . to the need to promote . . . the observance of good faith in

international trade"). Professor E6rsi reports that at the 1980 Vienna Conference the principle of
good faith was subject to a "restricted counterattack" by the delegates from Norway, Italy, and the
Republic of Korea. They proposed that the principle of good faith should be moved from
interpretation of the Convention to interpretation of the contract. The motion was not carried. Italy
proposed unsuccessfully the introduction of a separate article providing that "Iiln the formation
[interpretationI and performance of a contract of sale the parties shall observe the principles of good
faith and international cooperation." Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/lI
(1980). reprinted in OFFICIAL RECoRDs, supra note 24, at 82, 87: see also Ebrsi, supra note 4, at
348-49; Winship. Commnentar'v, supra note 19, at 632.
108. See Bonell, Methodology in Applying Uniform Law for International Sales Under the U.N.
Convention (Wien 1980), in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS To "rulXII INTERNATIONAL. CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 43. 62 (1986).

109. Ebrsi, supra note 4, at 348-349 ("The result was strange but gained for the principle of
good faith a foothold in an international convention for unification of law. It is hoped that this meager
result represents a modest start.").
110. Farnsworth. Problems of Unification of Sales Law from the Standpoint of the Common Law
Countries, in 2 PROBI- MS 01: UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SAI.ES LAW 19 (1980).
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everybody disagrees as to the impact, if any, that the principle of good faith may
have on the behavior of the parties to an international contract for the sale of
goods. 1
C.

NORTH-SoUTH

Opponents of the Convention in the United States have pointed out that in
many instances during the negotiations developed countries were held hostage by
the more numerous delegates from Third World countries in order to force
compromise solutions. They also expressed some alarm at the prospect that in the
future industrialized countries would have to seek the agreement of developing
and socialist countries to proposed modifications to the Convention.' 12 A more
balanced view of the Convention indicates that the coalition formed at times by
delegates from developing and socialist countries was helpful to counterweight
the powerful influence of industrialized nations.' 13 Moreover, since the basis for
reaching decisions is the principle of consensus, and UNCITRAL's working
groups represent, at least to some degree. all of the competing interests in the
Commission, it is unlikely that any modification to the Convention would pass
without the consent of some of the twenty-two Western industrialized countries
represented at the Vienna Conference. 114
According to Professor E6rsi, the so-called "North-South" debate was
characterized by -(a) the economic fact that developing countries mainly export
I 1l.Professor Farnsworth is of the opinion that references to good faith in art. 7(1) are
.'seemingly harmless words." See Farnsworth, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods
fiomn the Perspective of the Common Lait Countries, in LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE. supra note 79,
at 3. 18: see also Winship. Sales Contracts. supra note 13. at 67: Winship, Commentan, supra note
9. at 631 (arguing that the drafting history of art. 7 clearly supports a limited reading of the role of
good faith). Professor Bonell, in contrast, thinks that good faith "may even impose on the parties
additional obligations of a positive character." Bonell, Methodology in Applving Uniform Law, supra
note 108. at 63; Bonell. Article 7. in COMMENTARY. supra note 13. § 2.4.1, at 85. Accord J. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW, supra note 13, at § 94: UNIrORM SALES LAW, supra note 13, at 39; E6rsi, supra note
30. at 314- 15: Kasteley. Unification and Communitv, supra note 74, at 597-98. See also E6rsi,
General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 13, § 2.03. at 2-9 (hoping that "the good
faith clause may play an active role in spite of its location in the Convention.).
112. See Hearings on Treaty Doc. No. 9. supra note 9, at 39 (statement of Frank A. Orban If1)
"Common sense indicates that developed countries will discover the technical anomalies first and
will be the parties seeking amendments from the Third World and socialist bloc states." See also R.
BROOKS. WilY CONORESS SHOULD BE WARY OF TIlE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF

Gooos 4-5 (Heritage Foundation Background No. 361, June 15, 1984) (cited by Patterson, United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Unification and the Tension
Between Compromise amid Domination. 22 STAN. J.INT'L L. 263, 276 n.62 (1986) (modification of
the Convention "would probably require that the industrialized countries ask significant concessions
from the radicalized Group of 77 of the less-developed countries and from the Communist bloc, who
undoubtedly would expect a significant quid pro quo").
113. See Ghestin. Les obligations du vendeur, supra note 42. at 6.
114. It is unfortunate, however, that UNCITRAL failed to provide for some formal mechanism for
amendment of the Convention. See Rosett, Critical Reflections, supra note 25, at 294: Winship, The
Scope of the Vienna Convention, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 13, at 1- 1,1-49.
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raw materials and agricultural products and import technology and finished
goods, (b) the underdeveloped technological condition of their markets; and (c)
their frequently justified mistrust of developed industrial states."1 15 Some of the
issues discussed along the north-south conflict lines' 16 were the following: (a)
When should buyers give written and specific notice of nonconformity of the
delivered goods and what are the consequences of failing to provide that notice;
(b) under what circumstances should a party be allowed to suspend its
performance; (c) whether the passing of risk of goods sold in transit should be
fixed at the time of handing the goods over to the carrier or at the time of the
conclusion of the contract; and (d) the role of trade usages in international sales.
1. Buyer's Notification of Noncoqformity,
Although there are both buyers and sellers in developed and developing
countries, buyers in developing countries tend, by and large, to import
technically complex machinery whose defects may not be readily ascertainable.
Professor Date-Bah, an active participant in the negotiations on behalf of Ghana,
articulated the concern of many developing countries with the imposition of strict
notification requirements on account of nonconformity of the goods. He
explained that his country has numerous important tradesmen who are illiterate,
and that it often becomes necessary to call in foreign experts in order to carry out
tests on imported, complicated machinery. Not infrequently, delivered goods
remain in the port of arrival for more than two years and delivery to their final
destination is frequently delayed. 117 This is why the representatives of some
developing countries were wary about the consequences of their failure to notify
the seller as to the nonconformity of the goods in a timely fashion and why they
argued so strenuously against a strict requirement of notification of defects.
One of the longest and most dramatic debates at the UNCITRAL round of
negotiations on international sales concerned the procedure to follow in cases of
115. E6rsi, supra note 4, at 350; see also Roset, supra note 25, at 285, pointing out the impact
of those policy differences on the rules on performance on breach of contract, stating: Attitudes
toward performance and rules governing breach also will differ significantly depending on whether
one comes from an industrialized society with balanced number of buyers and sellers of finished
goods or from a have-not economy which must buy most manufactured and complex goods from
outsiders who are believed to be selling shoddy goods, whose flaws become apparent only long after
delivery, to unsophisticated buyers.
116. It should be noted at the outset that the confrontation between developed and developing
countries is simply a rough generalization, because at times, on this issue as well as in others,
representatives of developed countries sided with the opinion of the representatives of developing
countries, and vice versa. See Farnsworth, Developing International Trade Law.9 CALIF. W. IN1'L
L. J.460. 465 (1979) ("IW]hile there are differences between the common law and civil law
countries among the developed nations, ithas been somewhat surprising to me that the developing
nations are primarily 'developing' and only very secondarily by tradition divided into common law
or civil law.").
117. Report of Professor Date-Bah at the August 1979 Postdam colloquium of the International
Association of Legal Science on the Convention, cited by E6rsi, supra note 4, at 350 n.58 and
accompanying text.
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nonconformity.''

8

The most controversial issues centered around the period of

time within which the buyer is required to discover a nonconformity. the nature
and timing of the buyer's obligation to give notice of nonconformity, and the
consequences for the buyer's failure to give said notice. Those issues created a
division between the delegates from the industrialized and developing countries.
Article 38( 1) of the Convention requires the buyer to "examine the goods, or
cause them to be examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the
circumstances." This language seems to acknowledge that the shortest applicable period to inspect complex machinery received by a buyer in an isolated town
of a developing country may be different from the shortest applicable period to
inspect other types of goods by a sophisticated buyer in a big industrial city.1 9
In order to preserve buyer's remedies for nonconformity. article 39(1) requires
him to give notice to the seller, 'specifying the nature of the lack of conformity
within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered
it.' 120 Thus, articles 38 and 39 work in tandem to require buyers to examine the

118. Set, Edrsi. supra note 4. at 350-52 (recalling that the debate on arts. 39. 40. and 44 of the
Convention (arts. 37-38 of the Draft Convention of 1977) lasted for three davs and covered a very
wide range of issues). "Eight modifying texts were presented and no less than I II interventions .ere
made at sessions 16. 17. and 21.': ld. at 350: see also Farnsworth. The Vieina Convention: Ail
InternationalLafor the So/" (/lGoods.in PRI\AlE IN\ ESTORS ABROA---PROBLE.MS AND SOLUTIONS IN
INrRx.NTIONAL BSI.NtSS IN 1983 127. 134 (NI. Landv.ehr ed. 1983): Patterson. supra note 112.
119. Instead of speaking of the shortest practicable period tinder the circumstances, art. 38 of
ULIS requires the buyer to examine the goods "promptly." Referring to this provision of ULIS.
Professor Date-Bah states that
promptitude is too exacting a standard for the usual pace of things in third world
countries. Apart from the slower pace of life. there is the problem that the examination
of technologically sophisticated goods ma\ not be capable of being done promptly at
particular destinations because of the absence locally of people with the requisite skills
to carry out such examination.
Date-Bah. siqira note 88. at 29. He illustrates this point by offering the example of a buyer in a
dc\eloping country \ho must rely upon the opinion of a foreign expert to examine a computer with
complex technological features. He argues that even though the computer's detects may be readily
discovered upon examination by one familiar with the equipment. a considerable amount of time may
ha\e to elapse before an expert can be found and flows n in to inspect the computer. Date-Bah
persuasix ely argues that "such inspection by imported personnel may not be achieved within a
prolmtpt" period of titte. as required by art. 38 of ULIS." /d. at 30. Accordingly. Date-Bah considers
that the formula adopted in the Conention is more realistic, for it speaks of examination "within as
Short a period as is praticable in (le circumstances." Conseitiion. sop/a note 3. art. 380 ). He then
concludes:
Q'Qjuite oftei the shortest practicable period in Accra \\ill differ markedly from the
shortest applicable period in New York or Genoa. The fact that sufticient relativit\ is built into the
present forniula takes it more satisfacior" and acceptable to countries of different social and
econoittic systeis.'" Date-Bah. supra note 73. at 29. See also Patterson. supra note 112. at 300 It. t 69
(obser\ ig that to determine the timeliness of ally notice b\ applying a standard appropriate in a
country where such expertise is readily a\ailable wsould entail the application of commercial
standards of a developed country. not the "practicability" standard adopted in art. 38(l) of the
Cotvelt ioni).

120. Whereas the trst section of art. 39 isconcerned wilh the failure to n/thify the seller of a defect
which \\ias discovered or should have been disccv ered. the second section deals with the situation
\\here the defect could not havse been discovered because it \\ s latent. lietce there was no breach of
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goods within the shortest practicable period and to give notice to the seller within
a reasonable time after the buyer discovered or "ought to have discovered" a
nonconformity. '2 1 The buyer's failure to give adequate and timely notice results
in the loss of remedies for nonconformity.
The delegate from Ghana sought unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment
that would have eliminated the provision requiring notice within a reasonable
time and the sanction for the buyer's failure to give notice. 122 However, the basic
objection from other developing countries did not go so far. Their main point of
contention was that the sanction for failure to notify, i.e., buyer's loss of the right
to rely on nonconformity of the goods, was too harsh.' 23 A second proposal
introduced by the representative of Ghana was to retain the requirement of notice
within a reasonable time, but softening the sanction for failing to comply by
equating such failure with a failure to mitigate loss, thereby reducing the amount
of damages recoverable from the seller rather than precluding recovery altogether. This proposal met with wider acceptance but was unable to muster
sufficient support for its adoption. 124 This precipitated a crisis at the Conference,
because some delegates feared that the failure to give some deference to the
objections over notification of defects might result in the developing nations
refusing to ratify the Convention. 25 Obviously, the issue attracted sufficient
attention to force the delegates to search for a compromise solution between the
views of the representatives of some industrialized countries, who were
convinced that eliminating all of the buyer's rights to recover would effectively
ensure strict compliance with the notice requirements, and those espoused by
some representatives of developing countries, who would have been satisfied
duty to notify of the nonconformity. Art. 39 also establishes a two-year cut-off period, so that the
buyer cannot complain if the latent defect manifests itself after two years.
121. See Date-Bah supra note 88, at30. noting that in order toascertain when a buyer "ought to
have discovered a lack of conformity" under art. 39(l), the interpreter must first determine the
shortest applicable period within which thebuyer could have examined the goods under art. 38( 1).
122. Sunnar 'v Records of the Sixteenth Meeting of the First Committee. U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.97/C.I/Sr. 16, § 32 (1980), reprinted in Conference on Contracts, supra note 1:see
Patterson. supra note 112. at289-90.
123. E6rsi. supra note 4, at 350; Farnsworth, supra note 118, at 134.
124. The representatives of Kenya, Pakistan, China, Nigeria, the United Kingdom. Mexico.
Singapore. and Libya argued for Date-Bah's proposal. The representatives of the Netherlands,
Korea. Switzerland. Sweden, Bulgaria. Denmark, Austria, Australia. Japan. Belgium. the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Spain opposed it.
For a well-documented account of the debates. see
Patterson. supra note 112, at290.
125. The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee considered the Ghanaian proposal of
crucial importance for their continued support of theConvention. See Kastely, Uification Olid
Community, suipra note 74, at 619 (referring to the efforts of Mr. Hjerner. the Swedish delegate, to
find a compromise solution which would be satisfactory for the delegations from developing
countries). See also Patterson, supra note 112, at 292 n.128 (quoting Mr. Sevon. the Finnish
delegate, cautioning theother delegates that unless a compromise solution was found. UNCITRAL
might "regret havin adopted a stand which would prevent some states from acceding to the
Convention"). A joint proposal wvas submitted by delegates from Sweden. Finland, Ghana. Nigeria,
and Pakistan that eventually became arts. 39 and 44 of the Convention. Kastely, Id.
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with a rule that required notice but objected to the loss of all of the buyer's
remedies as a result of failure to provide timely notification. 126
This compromise retained the general requirement of notice within a reasonable time and the total bar of claims as the result of failure to give timely
notification. After a flurry of debate, however, the delegates adopted article 44,
which allows a buyer to deduct the value of the defect from the price despite the
lack of timely notice, if he has "a reasonable excuse" for his failure to give the
notice required under article 38(1). Thus, according to article 44, if the buyer has
a "reasonable excuse" for not complying with the notice requirement, the
damages the
sanction for untimely or inadequate notice is limited to whatever
2 7
seller would suffer as a result of the buyer's noncompliance.'
Professor Schlechtriem has criticized the compromise reached in article 44
for its lack of clarity as to what constitutes a "reasonable excuse."'128 In
126. See J.HONNOLD. UNIFORMi LAW. siipra note 13, at 261; Date-Bah, supra note 94, at 30; Ebrsi,
supra note 4. at 350-51: Farnsworth, supra note 118, at 134-35.
127. Article 44 also represents a compromise as to the maximum period within which the buyer
may assert a claim for latent or hidden defects. The sponsors of the amendment introduced in art. 44
agreed to accept the text of art. 39(2). whereby the buyer's claims are precluded after two years from
the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer. When some delegates proposed
a longer limitation period, the representative from Austria explained that in his country the buyer had
only eight days to give notice of nonconformity. and that, therefore, it was already a compromise on
his part to accept the two years. See Efrsi, supro note 4. at 350. Professor Date-Bah is of the opinion
that this two year cut-off period is too short to take care of sales of complicated machinery in which
latent defects may show up well after two years. Accordingly. he recommends those buyers either
obtain a guarantee which will override the two-year limitation period or simply "derogate from the
rule laid down in Art. 39(2)." Date-Bah, supra note 79, at 33. Professor Farnsworth recommends
sellers to do likewise, but in order to reduce the two-year period. See Farnsworth, supra note 118,
at 135.
128. Schlechtriem. Recent Developments in International Law, 18 ISRAEL L. REv. 309, 325
(1983). Professor Date-Bali easily visualizes a "reasonable excuse" in cases of complex machinery
where the person who examines the goods is not an expert. See also Date-Bah, supra note 79, at 32,
where he furnishes the following example of "reasonable excuse." A schoolmaster examines a new
copying machine, finds that it does not work but isunable to specify the nature of the nonconformity.
Should the schoolmaster hire an expert in order to identify the defect'? Professor Date-Bah does not
think so. forit would be too onerous. Thus, he concludes:
The seller is the one in breach and itshould be good enough that he is told that his
goods are defective. It should be his responsibility to detect the specific nature of the
lack of conformity. Assuming that. in the stated hypothetical. the headmaster's notice
failing to specify the cause of the nonfunctioning of the Xerox machine is held by a
39(), it is considered that art. 44 should be
court to be insufficient notice under art.
used to provide the headmaster with a defense. In other words, the headmaster should
his failure to give the required notice,"
be regarded as having a "reasonable excuse for
because he could not reasonably have been expected to know or ascertain the exact
cause why the machine would not work.
Honnold agrees with Date-Bah in that the difliculty of making a specification of nonconformity could
constitute a reasonable excuse under art. 44 of the Convention. J. HONNOLD. UNIFORM LAW,supra note
13. at 261. While discussing art. 39 of the Draft ULIS, providing for the buyer's obligation to specify
the nature of the lack of conformity as required by art. 39( 1) of the Convention, Professor Honnold,
who was a memnber of the U.S. delegation to the Hague Conference, suggested that the buyer should
not be required to state the exact nature of any lack of conformity and that the rules relating to the
content of the notice should not be "'too sirict." This suggestion did not prevail, however. See I
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contrast, Professor Date-Bah finds that article 44 is most useful in order to
avoid an unfair total loss of buyers' remedies whenever an examination of the
goods has been done within a reasonable period of time that cannot strictly
qualify as "short."' ' 29 In view of the uncertainties raised by this uneasy
compromise, Professor Farnsworth recommends sellers to vary by agreement
the Convention's provision on notice of nonconformity.' 3 0 Although this is one
of those compromises that can be properly characterized as "uneasy," it
embodies a fair accommodation of the competing interests of buyers and sellers
of complex machinery. It retains the core requirement of timely notice and the
penalty of absolute bar to recovery, yet it acknowledges the possibility of a
"reasonable excuse" justifying the failure. The extent to which this delicate
balance can be maintained in practice will depend on how broadly or narrowly
courts will interpret the expression "reasonable excuse." 131
2. Suspension of Performance

Article 62 of the Draft Convention provided for a party's right to suspend
performance when he had "good grounds to conclude" that the other party
would not perform a substantial part of his obligations. A long debate followed
on the test to be adopted for determining when the right to suspend performance
was justified. Some delegates from developing countries were fearful of abuses
of the power to suspend performance. They thought that a party's feeling of
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING TIlEINTERNATIONAL SALE Or

GOODS, THi

HAGUE, 2-25 APRIL 1964, at 72 (Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands ed. 1966), cited il Patterson,

supra note 112, at 286 n. 103.
129. Professor Date-Bah foresees the advantages of a provision such as art. 44 in case of a world
shortage of experts of certain machinery, preventing a buyer from undertaking a thorough
examination of the machinery within a year of its delivery. Under those circumstances, the buyer's
obligation under art. 38(l) would have been breached, because notice of nonconformity could not
have been given within a reasonable time after the nonconformity "'ought to have been discovered"
pursuant to art. 39(1 ). A liberal construction of the examination provisions of art. 38 may lead a
court to conclude that in this particular case a delay of a year was the shortest "practicable in the
circumstances." Yet the seller may make the strong case that a delay of one year for examining the
goods cannot be properly called "'short," Arguably, art. 44 would preclude a total loss of remedies
for buyers on account of a "reasonable excuse" for their failure to examine the goods within a
"short" period and to send the required notice. Date-Bah, supra note 88. at 3 1-32.
130. Farnsworth. supro note 118, at 135.
131. See Kastely. Unyication and Coniity. supra note 74. at 619 (noting that the compromise
also provides an economic disincentive to use the "reasonable excuse" device by denying recovery
LAW, supra note
for lost profits even if a legitimate excuse is found): see also J. HONNOLO. UNiIFo,

13. at 278-84: Patterson. supra note 112, at 302:
111f some national courts base their interpretations of terms and their analyses of
elements on parochial principles rather than on the compromise. then other national
courts may make "retaliatory" interpretations, parties may begin selective use of the
"opt-out" provision, and the goal of unification will remain as elusive as ever.
Patterson concludes a comprehensive discussion of this topic with an optimistic note, observing that
"'clourts in West Germany, applying article 39 oif ULIS. and courts in the United States, applying
section 2-6073)a) of the U.C.C.. have demonstrated the flexibility that the art. 44 compromise
requires." Id.

( footnotes omitted).
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insecurity about the other party's willingness or ability to perform was too
subjective. Accordingly, they pleaded for limiting suspension of performance to
situations where difficulties arose beyond doubt, e.g., where the other party went
bankrupt. Delegates from Western, developed countries, in contrast, wanted to
decrease the risk of performance and advocated that the probability of troubles
should suffice. 132 A long debate over this issue resulted, again, in a compromise.
The wording of article 62 of the Draft Convention was changed when this
provision was finally incorporated into article 71 of the Convention. According
to article 71, a party may suspend performance if "it becomes apparent" that the
other might not perform, for example, due to an impending insolvency or based
upon performance to date. 133
Professor Date-Bah fears that the right to suspend performance under article
71 may be used against the weaker party "not on the basis of facts, but on the
basis of mere appearances."' t 34 Although a party intending to suspend performance must give notice to the other in order to permit him to provide adequate
assurance of performance, such assurance may significantly increase the cost of
trading for those who can hardly afford it.' 3 5 In spite of its shortcomings,

132. Edrsi. .uipra note 4. at 351 (noting that the debate over this issue lasted four sessions): see
also Ziegel. supra note 72. at 9-34 ("The drafting history of the art. lart. 711 is a good example of
how the Vienna Conference intermittently became bogged down in what mnust seem to an outside
observer to have been a ntinor issue.")
133. Article 71 (3) of the Convention. supra note 3. provides that the party suspending
performance must immediately give notice of the suspension to the other party. who nay restore
performance by giving "adequate assurance of his performance" to the other party. Article 71 does
not specify, however, the consequences of the other party's failure to provide adequate assurance. In
contrast. under § 2-609(4) of the U.C.C.. a party's failure to provide adequate assurance entitles the
other party to treat the contract as repudiated after thirty days have elapsed. Professor Honnold
believes that Under the Cornvention failure to provide adequate assurance of performance also entitles
the other party to invoke the provisions on anticipatory repudiation in art. 72(). See J. HONNOLD.
UNIFORi LA\\. stupra note 13. § 394. But Protessor Ziegel rightly notes that anticipatory repudiation
only collies into play when -it is clear" that one of the parties will commit a tundamental breach of
the contract, and a party's failure to provide adequate assurance "is surely not unequivocal evidence
Of" his unwillingness to perform. particularly when he may question the validity of the requesting
part\'s feeling of insecurity to begin \with." Ziegel. supra note 72. at 9-35. Professor Date-Bah
agrees with Ziegel's opinlion in that anticipatory breach under art. 7201) "requires proof by the
person seeking to avoid the contract of facts from which a conclusion can logically and rationally
be reached by induction that the other party is likely to commit a fundamental breach. Mere
appearances are not good eniough." Date-Bali. supra note 88. at 34.
134. l)ate-Bah. supra note 88. at 34 ("appearances can be very deceptive and to give the right to
one partv to suspend performance of' his obligations . . . is tantaiount to imperilling the contract
righits i smaller and financially weaker business units which may not exude quite the same air of
financial reliability as the bigger units").
135. Date-Bali. si ria note 88. at 34-35:
Providing such an assurance Will often involve bank services produced at a fee. The
ceumulative effect of suspensions by several sellers may in fact therefore represent such
all iicreased cost of tradinc for the tinanciall w'eaker btier as to drive it tinder. Thus
the exercise of art. 7 1 bs several it a buyer s sellers ma' constitute a self-fulfilling
prophecy. since by their joint action they itnav succeed iii bankrupting a margiiall,
so)lvent buver. Thus a bisyer wsho ill fact is solvent but appears to several of his buyers
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however, it is clear that under article 71 the suspending party cannot invoke the
suspension right on mere hunches on the probability of nonperformance. Not
being restricted to the bankruptcy of the other party, the test for suspension is not
in article 62 of the
entirely objective, but it is a great deal less subjective than
36
Draft Convention and the Uniform Commercial Code.'
3. Passing of Risk of Goods Sold in Transit
Another sensitive issue between developing and industrialized countries
concerned the passing of the risk of loss under a contract of sale concluded while
the goods are in transit. Article 80 of the Draft Convention stated that the time
of passing of the risk is the time of handing the goods over to the carrier. The
delegate of Pakistan insisted that relating the passing of risk retroactively to the
dispatch of the goods might disadvantage developing countries, which generally
dispatch bulk commodities to be sold in transit. With the support from the
delegate from Ghana, Pakistan proposed an amendment to make risk pass at the
time of contracting. 137 This proposal was opposed by the delegate from Sweden,
who argued that concerns for the eventual damage suffered by the seller was
unwarranted, since goods sold in transit are generally insured. The Finnish,
Japanese, and Norwegian delegates also opposed the amendment suggested by
Pakistan, contending that it would be extremely difficult to establish whether the
damage occurred before or after the sale. After several discussions, a compromise came into being. The first sentence of article 68 contains the Pakistani
proposal, establishing as a general principle that the risk passes at the time of
conclusion of the contract. But this is followed by an exception, the applicability
of which is not easy to ascertain: the risk passes retroactively from the moment
38
the goods are handed over to the carrier "ifthe circumstances so indicate."

tobe insolvent can be rendered insolvent through the action permitted by art. 71 to his
sellers,
unless he isoperating with a large margin of solvency. This loads the dice
against small business units
which trade internationally.
under the Convention ismore subjective than
136. The standard forinvoking the suspension right
under German and English law. whose touchstone is. respectively, a "significant deterioration lin the
financial positionl" and "insolvency." See GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 321: Sale of Goods Act, art.
41( 1)(c) (United Kingdom). The Convention's test is not broader than the one provided by § 2-609(1)
of the U.C.C.. which merely requires reasonable grounds for "insecurity" to trigger the creditor's
right
to suspend performance. See J.HONNOLD, UNIFORMs LAW. supra note 13. at § 389: Ziegel, supra
note 72. at 9-35: Zwart. The New International Law of Sales. supra note 25, at 120 ("Thus,

suspension cannot be made on mere hunches, but requires a high degree of probability of nonperformance.").
137. Eiirsi. supra note 4. at 352.
138. Article 68 of the Convention, supra note 3.reads:
The risk in respect of goods sold in transit passes to the buyer from the time of the
conclusion of the contract. However. ifthe circumstances so indicate, the risk is
assumed by the buyer from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier who
issued the documents embodying the contract of carriage. Nevertheless. if at the time
of the conclusion of the contract of sale the seller knew or ought to have known that
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As in all compromises, each party gave concessions to the others. But this type
of compromise fails to provide guidelines for a national court to choose between
the main rule embodied in the first sentence of article 68 or the exception to the
rule embodied in the second sentence. Neither is the applicability of the
exception limited to those cases in which the time when the goods were damaged
cannot be proved. 139 Perhaps the issue is merely academic, because nothoughtful
buyer who purchases goods in transit will fail to require the inclusion of a
contractual clause dealing with the passage of risk. 140 Nevertheless, by masking
an irreconcilable position behind an illusory compromise, article 68 of the
Convention fails to provide a workable rule to fill the gap left by the parties.
4. Role of Trade Usages
The scope and application of trade usage in contract interpretation turned into
an issue with political overtones that sharply divided the UNCITRAL
delegates. 4 t' This controversy confronted the views of representatives from
socialist and developing countries with those from Western, developed
countries.1 4 2 Aside from the need of planned economies for security and
foreseeability in contractual relationships, 143 the main reason why many develthe goods had been lost or damaged and did not disclose this to the buyer. the loss or
damage is at the risk of the seller.
139. Ebrsi. supra note 4. at 352. While placing on the buyer the consequences of any inadequacy
in the insurance, the passing of risk at the time the goods are handed over to the carrier obviates any
difficulties of proof and has the advantage that only the buyer must pursue claims arising from
damage occurring while the goods are in transit. See Nicholas. Article 68, in COMMEuNTARY. supra note
13, at 498, (noting that the principal difficulty with art. 68 lics in the meaning of "if the
circumstances so indicate").
140. See Honnold, Risk of Loss, in INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra note 12. at 8-I. 8-14 (1984)

(observing that the risk provisions of the U.C.C. fail to address the sale of goods in transit).
141. See J. HONNOLD. UNIFORM LAW, supra note 13, at § 112-122: Ebrsi. supra note 4. at 341:
Note, Trade Usages, supra note 28. 636-37 (1984) (quoting Lebedev. a Soviet delegate to the
Vienna Conference, who observed that the provision on trade usages was one of the most
fiercely-debated issues during the preparatory discussions): see also Note. The 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts ]or the InternationalSale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?. 21
TEx. INT'L L.J. 541 (1986) Ihereinafter Note, Will a Homeward Trend Emeriie?l.
142. See Farnsworth, Developing International Trade Law, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 461. 465-66
(1979):
Viewed in the context of the United Nations, [trade usagel become[s] political.
Generally. developed nations like usages. Most usages seem to be made in London.
whether in the grain or cocoa trade, for example. Developing countries, on the other
hand, tend to regard usages as neo-colonialist. They cannot understand why the usages
of, let us say, the cocoa trade should be made in London.
See also Rosett, supra note 25, at 285, who frames the controversy on deeper ideological grounds:
Some legal regimes are quite content with the past and look to tradition as a fountain
of accumulated wisdom. For most Americans, community practice as embodied in
common law is a source of just expectations about the future behavior of others. In
contrast, those regimes that perceive their society as shackled by the remnants of an
unjust past which must be smashed by a revolutionary process of renovation are not
likely to be sympathetic to perpetuating past behavior by enshrining it as binding rules.
143. Because the socialist view gives priority to the security of the contract and foreseeability, it
is not surprising that prime reliance isplaced on the express agreement of the parties and written rules
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oping and socialist countries are suspicious of the impact of trade usages in the
international sphere is based on the fact that those usages were settled primarily
by industrialized nations and are likely to reflect the interest of such countries. 144
In contrast, developed countries like the United States and Great Britain place
prime emphasis on regularly observed trade usages, which are said to increase
mercantile flexibility, and, thereby, economic efficiency. 145 The Uniform Commercial Code's liberal approach to trade usage naturally prompted the U.S.
delegation to press for wide acceptance of usage of trade in the interpretation of
contracts for the international sale of goods. 146

over the more flexible and uncertain outcome provided by trade usages. See Farnsworth, supra note
142, at 465.
lUlsages are looked on with perhaps even more suspicion by the Eastern European
countries, because the Eastern Europeans, being even more bureaucratic in outlook
than our multinationals, like to have everything in their files. There is nothing more
distressing to a bureaucrat than the thought that some Englishman or Ghanian is going
to appear and claim that there is a usage that he does not have in his files.
144. See Summary Records of the Meetings of the First Committee. (6th meeting), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.97/C. I/SR., reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 24, at 263 (reporting the statements
made by Mr. Kopac. delegate from Czechoslovakia: ". . . [B]uyers and sellers from some countries,
particularly those from developing countries, had not participated in the establishment of usages and
would yet be bound by them, even if those usages were contrary to the Convention"). Date-Bah,
supra note 88, at 27: Note, Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, supra note 141, at 553; Note, Trade
Usages. supra note 29, at 641, quoting the Yugoslavian and Soviet delegates to the Vienna
Conference, who respectively stated that trade usage has "been formed by a restricted group of
countries . . . whose position did not express world wide opinion" and that "[u]sages [arel often
devices established by monopolies and it would hence be wrong to recognize their priority over the
law." See also Khan, Unification of the Law of InternationalSale of Goods-Issues and Importance,'
in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRANSACTIONS 39, 50-53 (R. Khan ed. 1973). It is noteworthy that
not all developing nations took a negative approach to trade usage. Noticeably, the Mexican
perspective was similar to the United States' perspective. Note, Trade Usages, supra note 29, at 638
n. 188.
145. Usage as a tool to fill in the gaps and to interpret the terminology in the parties' agreement
is essential in international commercial transactions, where the need for speed means that the parties
are likely to bargain as little as possible and are likely to address in detail every possible problem
related to the contract. In this connection, Honnold observes:
The world's commerce embraces an almost infinite variety of goods and transactions:
a law cannot embody the special patterns that now are current, let alone those that will
develop in the future. Many of these patterns will be reflected in the contract, but there
are practical limitations on the ability of the parties to envisage and answer every
possible question. Many transactions must be handled quickly and informally. Even
where there is time to prepare detailed documents, an attempt to anticipate and solve
all conceivable problems may generate disagreements and prevent the making of a
contract: and the most basic patterns may not be mentioned because, for experienced
parties, "they go without saying."
J. HONNOLD. UNIFORM LAW, supra note 13, § 251; see also Note. Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?,
supra note 141. at 550.
146. The drafters of the U.C.C. incorporated a vast array of trade usage and courses of dealing
into every contract governed by the Code. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDERTHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 98- 104 (2d ed. 1980). Section 1-205(2) of the U.C.C.
defines trade usage as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question." Contracting parties are free to vary their contract terms from the standard
trade usage and course of dealing, but they must do so expressly in the contract. Thus, U.C.C. §
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The articulated view of the socialist countries on matters of usage was that
usages can only be applied if the parties explicitly agreed to them in the contract
and they do not violate statutory provisions. 147 The Western view favored the
application of usages even if the parties agreed to their application only
impliedly, and if reasonable-thinking parties who are in the position of the
contracting parties consider them as being applicable. 148 With these opposite
views on the conference table, it was clear that the issue had to be settled through
a compromise.
Article 9(1) incorporates explicit agreements on usages and the trade practices
that the parties have established between themselves. Article 9(2) states when
trade usages are deemed to have been implicitly incorporated into the agreement,
that is, (a) when the parties have either subjective (the parties "knew" in fact)
or objective (the parties "ought to have known") knowledge of the usage, and
(b) when the usage is widely known to, and regularly observed by, those in the
trade. 149 The Commentary to this provision permits a finding of objective
knowledge upon the proof of regular observance in the particular trade. .'5 0 The
2-202, comment 2 states that [ulnless carefully negated [trade usages] have become an element of
the meaning of the words used." The parties do not have to be aware of the trade usage. Section
1-205(3) provides that "any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of
which they are or should be aware [may] give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms
of an agreement." (Emphasis added.) See Note, Trade Usages, supra note 29, at 639 ("[llf the
contract called for the seller to deliver chickens and trade usage defines 'chickens' as 'young
chickens,' the usage would be admitted into evidence [under the U.C.C.I if the seller delivered old
chickens").
147. But see Maskow, supra note 79, at 58 ("Socialist law in general is rather reluctant in respect
of usages, but in international trade they are accepted to a higher degree than in domestic matters.").
148. E6rsi, supra note 4, at 342.
149. The Convention, supra note 3, art. 9 refers to usages "in international trade ...regularly
observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in theparticular trade concerned." Therefore,
the particular usage must be confined to a certain product, region, or set of trading partners. See Dore
& Franco. A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INr'L L.J. 49, 58 (1982).
As to the degree of "internationality" of the usage, Professor Honnold comments:
Must the usage be "international"? This question can lead to confusion, but the
Convention clarifies the issue. Under Article 9(2) the usage must be one which "in
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by parties to" such
transactions. A usage that is of local origin (the local practices for packing copra or
jute, or the delivery dates imposed by arctic climate) may be applicable if it is "'widely
known to,and regularly ohserved by," parties to international transactions involving
these situations.
J.HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 13, § 121 (emphasis in original).
150. The trade usage provision appeared as art. 8 of the 1978 Draft Convention and later became
art. 9 of the Convention. Comment 4 to art. 8 of the 1978 Draft Convention reads:
The determining factor whether a particular usage is to be considered as having been
impliedly made applicable to a given contract will often be whether it was "widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned." In such a case it may be held that the parties "ought to
have known" of the usage.
Text of Drtp Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale oJ Goods Approved by the United
Nations Conmission on International Trade Law Together with a Commentary Prepared bv the
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requirement that the usage be "widely known," however, seems to indicate that
it should be accepted by socialist, developing, and developed market economy
countries. 151
Whereas most delegates agreed that usage explicitly incorporated into the
contract binds the parties, the more difficult issues are raised by usage not
explicitly mentioned in the contract. Article 9 makes clear that usages to which
the parties have impliedly agreed are binding on them, thus adopting the
Western view that usages may be used as gap-fillers even if the parties failed to
agree on them in the contract. 152 Article 9, however, fails to specify whether
usages supersede conflicting provisions of the Convention. 153 This omission is
probably due to objections from delegates of socialist countries, who insisted
that usages should not override statutory provisions to the contrary. 154 Thus, the
final version of article 9 evolved as both a partial answer to the objections
raised by the delegates from socialist countries and as a compromise with
them. 155 However, the commentary to the Draft Convention and the principle of
party autonomy embodied in article 6 indicates that a usage that has been
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/5/1979 [hereinafter Text of Draft Convention]. While the
Commentary to the 1978 Draft Convention and the Convention does not enjoy the persuasive force
of the official comments to the U.C.C., it still may serve as a useful tool for its interpretation. See
Note, Trade Usages, supra note 29. at 636 n. 104.
151. See Maskow, supra note 79, at 58-59; Kasteley, Unification and Community. supra note 74,
at 613 ("Alrticle 9 should be interpreted to allow discussion of whether newcomers and others who
lack experience or sophistication in international trade 'ought to have known' of its usages").
152. The U.S. Department of State noted with approval that both the U.C.C. and the Convention
give effect to regularly observed trade usages, incorporate actual or implied knowledge of a usage,
and allow recognition of usages in a particular trade. LegalAnalysis of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980). in MESSAGE FROMTHE PRESIDENr OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING TIlE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,

TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 5 (1983).
153. Under art. 9(3) of ULIS, supra note 1, it was clear that usages derogate from the relevant
provision of ULIS. Also in contrast with art. 9 of the Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(3) of ULIS
made clear that a usage is admissible to interpret the meaning of terms used in the contract. See Text
of Draft Convention, supra note 150. comment 6 to art. 8 (noting that the Draft Convention "does
not provide any explicit rule for the interpretation of expressions, provisions or forms of contract
which are widely used in international trade and for which the parties have given no interpretation").
It has been persuasively argued, however, that usages may be used to interpret contract terms
pursuant to art. 8(3) of the Convention, supra note 3 which states that "iln determining the intent
. See Trade Usages, supra note
of a party . . . due consideration is to be given to . . . usages .
29, at 659.
154. See Ebirsi. supra note 4, at 342. The delegate from Czechoslovakia proposed an amendment
to art. 9(2) adding at the end of that paragraph the words "provided the usage is not contrary to this
Convention." The amendment was supported by several socialist states. Nevertheless, the Mexican
delegate argued successfully that:
Any specific usage known to the parties should override the Convention because, if
the parties decided to conform to a usage, it was because it responded to their needs
with respect to a given contract. The problem was slightly more delicate when the
usage was not known, but the solution should be the same because knowledge and
consequently agreement by the parties with regard to that usage was presumed.
See Text of Draft Convention. supra note 150. at 263-64.
155. See Kasteley, Unification and Communuitv, suipra note 74, at 610.
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expressly or impliedly
accepted by the parties supersedes a conflicting provision
56
of the Convention. 1
III. Conclusion
The lengthy period of negotiations and endless deliberations on the draft text
of the Convention demonstrates the great difficulty of reaching consensus and of
obtaining amendments and clarifications. This is not surprising, because the
representatives in charge of drafting a uniform law of sales were confronted with
the task of reconciling different legal traditions that, conceptually, are worlds
apart in many areas of contract law. The drafters also confronted widely different
approaches to international business transactions from countries with free-market
oriented economies and those with centrally planned economies, as well as
different policy approaches between developing and industrialized nations. 157
According to some commentators, the Convention has failed to achieve any
meaningful consensus on the law of international sales. In a thought-provoking
essay, an American legal scholar has questioned the Convention's usefulness as
a vehicle for unification due to its frequent uneasy compromises that avoid
difficult questions by failing to deal with them and its consequent deference to
domestic law. 158 In contrast, Professor John Honnold, who participated actively
in the negotiations, prefers to describe the Convention as "a triumph of
cooperative international work," 159 and a prominent legal comparativist who
describes himself as a "tolerant participating 'accomplice' who is ready to
156. See Text Draft of the Con vention, supra note 150, comment 5 to art. 8:

Since usages which become binding on the parties do so only because they have been
explicitly or implicitly incorporated into the contract, they will be applied rather than
conflicting provisions of this Convention on the principle of party autonomy.
Therefore, the provision in ULIS art. 9, paragraph 2. that in the event of conflict
between an applicable usage and the Uniform Law, the usages prevail unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, a provision regarded to be in conflict with the constitutional
principles of some States and against public policy in others, has been eliminated as
unnecessary. (Footnote omitted).
See also Trade Usages, supra note 29, at 661. stating that the rule that usages supersede contrary
provisions of the Convention is implied by the text of art. 6 which permits the parties to contractually
derogate from or vary the effect of any of the Convention's provisions.
157. See Kastely, Unification and ConiityN., supra note 74. at 603 ("UNCITRAL includes
representatives of thirty-eight nations, some of which are separated by deep conflict and suspicion.
Understandably, these divisions occasionally surfaced and representatives occasionally responded by
calling for formal and limited rules that could be mechanically applied").
158. Professor Rosett states that the rules of the Convention are not "in any significant respect
superior" to the legal framework established by art. 2 of the U.C.C., and that the false compromises
reached at the Vienna Conference "undermine the substantive unification of law and submerge the
conflict enough to hinder easy correction." Rosett, supra note 25, at 282, 286, 304. For a condensed
version of Professor Rosett's article, see Rosett, The InternationalSales Convention: A Dissenting
View, 18 INTr'i LAW. 445 (1984). For another pessimistic view of the Convention's chances of
achieving any significant level of uniformity in the international community, see Note. Unification
and Certainty. supra note 26, at 1999. A similar assessment of the Convention is given by John
Feltham, who was the British delegate of the Vienna Conference. Feltham, supra note 32, at 346.
159.

Statement of Professor John Honnold, Hearingson Treaty Doc. No. 9, supra note 10, at 19.
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accept the inevitable,"
is of the opinion that the Convention's accomplishments
60
outweigh its flaws. 1
Admittedly, the Convention is the result of a compromise rather than a
consensus, and not all of the compromises reached at the Vienna Conference can
be categorized as "workable." But it is not true that the aim of UNCITRAL was
to reach a final text at all costs. Rather, pursuant to the objectives of the United
Nations, the work of UNCITRAL and its ad hoc working groups appointed by the
leading committee may be more accurately characterized as a search for
compromises in order to reach workable rules. Whenever a workable compromise could not be reached, the drafters of the Convention chose a contradictory
technical formulation based on the lowest common denominator. 161
A fair assessment of the Convention must start by acknowledging that the
significant structural differences among the nations represented at UNCITRAL
made it extremely difficult to achieve meaningful compromises, and that the
outcome of many of those is simply not to resolve the problem they purport to
address. This is of course disadvantageous for the cause of unification. But those
illusory compromises were sometimes necessary in order for the conference to
continue its work to completion. 162 Other compromises are clear-cut and provide
meaningful guidance to the parties. If the need for compromises in every effort
at the level of international legislative unification is readily accepted, then the
gaps and shortcomings of the Convention that resulted from those compromises
demand our understanding and, at least up to a certain point, our satisfaction. 163
160. E6rsi. supra note 4, at 356.
161. E6rsi, su ra note 30. at 315 (1979). See Speidel, Book Review. 5 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus.
432. 438 (1983) (reviewing J. HONNOLD, UNIEORMi LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL, SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1982), suggesting that the Convention was produced more from a
'compromise among competing legal traditions" than an assessment of the "'needs and practices of
international trade"): See also Rosett, supra note 25, at 286 ("The aim of the [UNCITRAL] Working
Groups over the years was to find the right combination of words that would not be too offensive to
any participant in the negotiations."): Ghestin. Les obligations du vendeur, supra note 42, at 6
("Lorsqu'un compromis n'a pu tre rdalisd, les r6dacteurs de laConvention n'ont pas hdsit6 A
admettre une v6ritable contradiction / l'intrieur m~me de celleci.").
162. E6rsi. supra note 4, at 346. who speaks figuratively of "saving the bulk of the cargo by
throwing only a small part of it overboard." Contra Rosett, supra note 25, who states that in the
context of the Convention "the false appearance of agreement is especially serious because of the
rigid position the Convention takes toward further legal growth. With the potential for clarification
and growth blocked, these false compromises undermine substantive unification of law and submerge
the conflict enough to hinder easy correction."
163. See Zwart, The New lnternationalLaw of Sales. supra note 25, at 127 ("Whatever the trials
and tribulations during gestation, the world generally has received the Convention favorably and is
slowly understanding its meaning. With growing knowledge of the Convention, its acceptance is
becoming more widespread."): Hellner. The U.N. Convention on InternationalSales of Goods-An
Outsider's View, in IusINTER NATIONiS 71 (S.Riesenfeld ed. 1983) (Commemorative Edition)
(concluding that even with its shortcomings, the Convention will provide a basis for unification of
the law of international commerce). See also Plantard, Un nouveau droit uoiforme de la vente
internationale: La Convention des Nations Unies du II avril 1980. 115 JOURNAL DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (CLUNET) 311. 366 (1988): Niggemann, Les obligations de racheteur,supra note 96,
at 43: UNIiORM SALES LAW,suspra note 13, at 115 ("While various provisions of the Uniform Law for
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The final judgment on the acceptability of an international convention involves
something else than weighing its possible virtues against its failures. The
Convention should be primarily judged by whether it improves the present
64
situation with regard to the realization of the elusive goal of unification.
Recognizing its shortcomings, the question is whether a limited Convention is
still preferable to no Convention. Viewed in this light, the Convention represents
an improvement over the uncertainties of a foreign law that must be identified,
understood, and proven in court. The extent of signatures, ratification, and
accessions to the Convention from countries of the most varied economic,
political, and legal backgrounds must be taken into account to ascertain whether
the Convention actually achieved a fair balance of the vital interests at stake.
UNCITRAL's success in adopting a Convention with wider acceptability is
evidenced by the fact that the original eleven States for which the Convention
came into force on January 1, 1988, included countries from every geographical
region, every stage of economic development, and every major legal, social, and
economic system.
Any overall favorable judgment on the Convention should not exaggerate its
actual accomplishments. I do not believe that the legal experts representing the
sixty-two countries that met in Vienna envisioned perfect unification, a goal as
elusive as it is impossible, as attested by the United States' experience with
unification at a municipal level. 165 Its main purpose is to serve as a cornerstone
to legal harmonization in the long run, rather than to achieve perfect unity of
international sales by legislative fiat. 166 To this day, the Convention represents
the most broad-based attempt to reach that goal and as such holds the greatest
potential for success-in itself a worthy achievement.

International Sales may give rise to criticism, on the whole, it is a modern law that will serve its
practical purpose").
164. See Date-Bah, supra note 88, at 37 ("Such a multilateral convention cannot be ideal for any
particular group of states. What is important is whether a reasonab!e balance has been struck."). See
also Winship, New Rules Jbr InternationalSales, supra note 13, at 1234 ("no legal text is perfect.
.. . All we can ask is that a text be an improvement on the present state of the law."); Note, Will
a Homeward Trend Emerge?. supra note 141, at 541, 544; Winship, The Scope of the Vienna
Convention, supra note 1. § 1.04. at 1-50 (stating that the Convention is modest in scope. "[blut
if traders cannot agrce on the applicable law. the Convention will be a readily available compromise
which is an improvement on the uncertainty of conflict-of- laws rules and the difficulty of proving
foreign law").
165. Whether the U.C.C. has ever achieved "true" and "complete" unification is a nmatter of
considerable debate. While areas of disunity in commercial law remain, most commentators would
agree that today's U.S. commercial law is "more uniform, more certain, more precise and more
sensible" than in the 1930s. See J. Wiir & R. SUMiMRS, supra note 125, at 20-21.
166. See Kastely. Unication and Community, supra note 74, 574, 577 (arguing that one of the
main objectives of the Convention is to promote international harmony by creating "a rhetorical
community in which its readers first assent to the language and values of the text itself, and then use
the language and values to inform their relations with one another").
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Whether national courts will pay proper heed to the Convention's future
growth, hence promoting uniformity in its application, remains to be seen. ,67
Only the future will tell whether the spirit of compromise in which many of the
rules were drafted will fulfill the wish expressed in the Preamble to the
Convention: "to promote the long-term goal of a coherent and sensible world
legal order for international trade."

167. The effort to insure uniform interpretation of the Convention is an on-going process in which
scholars and international organizations seek ways to promote discussion and deliberation. The
uniform application of international agreements, with a focus upon the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. was a topic at the Twelfth Congress of the International
Academy of Comparative Law, held in Sydney and Melbourne, Australia, August 18-26, 1986. In
his report, Professor Honnold warned that "the objectives of [the Convention] can be undermined by
different national approaches to interpreting and applying the uniform international rules." J.
HONNOLD, METHtODOLOGY TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY IN APPLYING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, EXAMINED IN

1980 U.N. CONVENTION 2 (1986)
(general report for Topic IC submitted to the Twelfth Congress of the International Academy of
TiE SETTING OF TIIE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER TIlE

Comparative Law) (cited by Patterson. supra note 112, at 278 n.68). The report summarized fifteen
national reports containing, inter alia. information on the extent to which courts in the respective
countries made use of international case law, scholarly writing, and legislative history. See Sev6n,
Method of Unification of L'awfior the International Sale o1Goods, in TIlE FINNISH NATIONAL REPORTS
TO TIE TWEIF-tH CONGRESS 01 'H'tEINTE RNATIONAL ACADEMN OF COMPARATIVE LAW 11

(1986) (ed. by

Kaarina Buure-Hagglund): Sutton. Methodology in Applying Uniform Law for InternationalSales
(Under the U.N. Convention) (Vien, 1980) in LAw AND AUSTRALIAN LEGAL THINKING IN THE 1980'S,
A COLLECTION OF AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTIONS 10 THE 12TnH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE

LAW 91 (1986) (ed. by E.S. Tay); Bonell. Methodology inApplying Uniformn Law for International
Sales Under the U.N. Convention (Wien

1980) in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XII rH

INIERNATIONAL CONGRESS O1 CONIPARATIrv

43 (1986).

LAW

SUMMER 1989

